Free trade and globalisation have become one of the debated issues or topics with reference to development especially that of poor countries. This essay takes into account free trade and the development of poor countries. It analyses some of the arguments in favour of and against free trade to conclude whether it helps to advance or retard the development of poor countries. It also gives some facts about the gap between rich and poor countries.
Globalisation according to Kaviraj (2004:140) refers to “the process of intensifying interdependence and emergence of networks of regular transaction between and across the borders of economies and states throughout the world”. Globalisation in this sense is the integration of states in terms of economy, politics, finance and others. Globalisation in this essay is considered with reference to trade and politics.
Free trade is the trade between two or more countries without any restrictions imposed by the governments or other regulators; thus the free movement of goods and services across national frontiers (O’Brien and Williams, 2007:139; Vander Weyer, 2005:24). It leads to the liberalisation of the markets of countries through the removal of tariffs, quotas and other form of barriers to allow the free flow of products beyond national frontiers.
The disparity between rich and poor countries today is very pathetic and there is the need to reduce this disparity. According to the World Bank (2000:232-33), the Gross National Income of poor countries was between US$500 and US$800 inclusive while that of the developed countries ranged from US$23,000 to US$34,260. Also, 2.1 billion people in poor countries live on less than US$2 and 880 million on less than US$1 a day (ibid, 2008:1) but this is different in developed countries like US and UK where most people can afford the basic necessities of life. Free trade is considered as one of the tools for development in poor countries (Bhagwati, 2004).
According to WTO (2002a; cited in Mackintosh, 2004:46 ), “The economic case for an open trading system based upon multilaterally agreed rules is simple enough, and rests largely upon commercial common sense… According to the principle of comparative advantage, countries A and B still stand to benefit from trading with each other even if A is better than B at making everything”.
The theoretical catalyst driving free trade has been the Comparative Advantage developed by David Ricardo in the 19th century. According to this theory countries engaged in free trade tend to benefit based on specialisation on production of the products they produce at the least cost. He, Bhagwati (2004) and other liberal political economist see free trade as a positive-sum and not a zero-sum outcome. Some of the benefits of free trade include increase in export and import as a result of the reduction in or removal of tariffs, increase in competition from abroad to the domestic market which will increase efficiency and cut cost thereby preventing domestic monopolies from charging high prices. It also brings about investment due to the importation of goods from other countries and this brings about revenue into the economy. In poorer countries, the only provider of public and merit goods like health care is the government which is the main political unit in a country. The government can translate this improvement in revenue into investment in these merit goods raising the level and access to healthcare, raising social standards. For countries to benefit from free trade there should therefore be rules and regulations governing how trade should be conducted. This is what the WTO claims to do;
“The world Trade Organisation (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters and importers conduct their business”. (WTO, 2002b; cited in Mackintosh, 2004: 69).
Majority of WTO’s members are from these poor countries according to the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001, which emphasizes how important the development of these poor countries is at the heart of the organisation. It seeks to ensure that these poor countries benefit from trade globalisation and secure a fair share of growth (WTO, 2001: para. 2 & 3). Poor countries remain poorer and this is due to the difficulties the governments of these countries face in exporting their products to the developed world. As Bhattacharjea ( 2004: 14-17) argues the promises of benefits to governments of poor countries by WTO for joining the organisation remain illusory due to the loopholes in the rules that govern it.
The World Bank (2008) prescribes the concentration of government efforts in the agricultural sector, which is a key area for development in poor or developing countries. The governments of these poor states whose economy are mostly agriculturally based will be able to developed properly if they have equal access to the markets of the developed countries by exporting their agricultural goods which they possess comparative advantage. However, negotiations with reference to agricultural trade liberalisation have mostly ended up with no agreement but disappointments on the side of these poor countries. Agriculture trade liberalisation was a pivotal among the former countries during the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference but no positive outcome was reached as the conference ended without their concern being addressed. As argued by O’Brien and Williams (2007:161) “The failure to make significant progress on the talks reflects both the continued weakness of developing countries and the veto power possessed by the EU and the United States in trade negotiations”.
Liberia had a GDP share of 76.9% in agriculture as at 2006 (O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 162) and if she is unable to have access to the markets of the rich countries, how would she develop based on its comparative advantage? As argued by Chang (2008:75) the “West” “tends to disproportionately protect products that poor countries exports, especially garments and textiles”.
Free trade retards the development of poor countries since they lack the necessary technological know-how and skills to compete with the developed world. Poor countries may be endowed with lot of natural resources and to benefit from them there is the need to add much value to these goods. Adding value to these resources promote them from their raw state to finished or semi-finished goods which will attract more capital than when they are exported in their natural states. Governments of poor countries judging from factor endowment theory may have a lot of land enriched with lot of natural resources and as a result should engage in the exportation of these natural resources where they have comparative advantage. Poor countries based on their level in terms of industrial and technological development are not equipped to enable them compete with the developed countries to benefit from free trade. Free trade like any other competition, favours the rich over the poor and the strong over the weak (Shaikh, 2005:43). This is due to the advancement and industrialised nature of the rich countries. For poor countries to enjoy the economies of scale in free trade, they should not be exposed to fierce competitive international market in their early stage of development but be allowed to develop their industries and technology. As argued by Chang (2008:66), ‘they need time to improve their capabilities by mastering advanced technologies and building effective organizations’.
Even the developed countries like UK, US and China were protective during the early stages of their development. They protected their manufacturing industries and other products that they had comparative advantage from external competition till they were well developed to compete with the external market.
According to Chang (2002:2), “the developed countries did not get where they are now through the policies and the institutions that they recommend to developing countries today. Most of them actively used ‘bad’ trade and industrial policies, such as infant industry protection and export subsidies – practices that these days are frowned upon, if not actively banned, by the WTO (World Trade Organisation)”
Liberia’s 76.9% GDP in agriculture would benefit Liberia if raw materials from this sector are transformed into finished products by industries in the country to be exported to gain more profit than they will gain in their raw state. This can be achieved when factories are shielded from fierce competition for sometime as was done in the case of the UK and the US.
Ivory Coast suffered massively from free trade when she clinched to it at its development stage in 1986 where her chemical, textile, shoe and automobile industries virtually collapsed due to the 40% tariff cuts. Unemployment rate in Zimbabwe in 1990 also increased from 10% to 20% as a result of trade liberalisation (Chang, 2008: 62).
In concluding, it can be argued from the above that free trade can help to advance poor countries development but not in their early stages of growth where they should be shielded from fierce competition. They should be left to compete when they are strong enough and at this stage also the rich should open up to them so that they can benefit from the benefits of free trade.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bhattacharjea, A. (2004) ‘Playing by the Rules? Developing Countries in the World Trade Regime’, in Bromley, S., Mackintosh, M., Brown, W., and Wuyts, M. (ed.) A world of Whose Making? Making the International: Economic Interdependence and Political Order. London: Pluto Press, pp. 11-31
Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Chang, H.-J. (2002) Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, London: Anthem Press
(2008) Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
Kaviraj. S (2004) ‘The Politics of Liberalization in India’, in Bromley, S., Mackintosh, M., Brown, W., and Wuyts, M. (ed.) A world of Whose Making? Making the International: Economic Interdependence and Political Order. London: Pluto Press, pp.131-171
Mackintosh, M. (2004) ‘Gaining from Trade?’, in Bromley, S., Mackintosh, M., Brown, W., and Wuyts, M. (ed.) A world of Whose Making? Making the International: Economic Interdependence and Political Order. London: Pluto Press, pp. 33-71
O’Brien, R. and Williams, M. (eds.) (2007) Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics. 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Shaikh, A. (2005) ‘The Economic Mythology of Neoliberalism’, in Saad-Filho, A. and Johnston, D. (ed.) Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader. London: Pluto Press, pp. 41-49
Vander Weyer, M. (2005) ‘Can Free Trade Be Fair Trade?’ New Statesman (London, England: 1996), V. 134, pp. 22-25. WilsonWeb [Online]. Available at: http://vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com (Accessed: 10 February 2009).
World Bank (2000) World Development Indicators 2000. Washington D.C: World Bank [Online] Available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2000/index.htm (Accessed: 26 March 2009)
(2008) World Development Report: Agriculture for Development. [Online]. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/2795087-1192111580172/WDROver2008-ENG.pdf (Accessed: 27 March 2009)
World Trade Organisation (2001) Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration. [Online]. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf (Accessed: 18 March 2009)
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Thursday 8 October 2009
Impact of Trade Policies on Tanzania
This is a write up on the impact of trade policy on Tanzania which is part of a group case study on the country about the impact of trade, investment and debt policies. The findings of the study with reference to trade policies on the country were that the country has improved a lot in terms of development and reduction in poverty. Secondly, the current recession did not by pass the country as it has had a knock-on-effect on trade especially on textile and garment trade with the outside world. It reflects the argument that free trade enhances development but too much openness does not help developing economies.
Tanzania was formed through the 1964 merger between Tanganyika and Zanzibar both of which were colonies of Britain and had their independence in 1961 and 1963 respectively. The country‘s economy is highly dependent on the agriculture sector where eighty percent of the population depends and contributes about 50% to GDP and 70% of earnings from merchandise exports (Ngasongwa, 2003: 4; C.I.A, 2009; Levin and Ohlin, 2008). The researcher found out that most of the country’s export were and are still from the agriculture sector which includes cotton, tea, coffee, tobacco, cashew nuts and other processed and unprocessed agriculture products. Tanzania’s main trading and export partners as at 2007 are UAE 4.9%, Germany 6.5%, India - 9.7% and China - 10.3% (C.I.A, 2009).
Since independence in 1964, Tanzania has pursued a number of trade policies including the famous Arusha Declaration in 1967 by the first president Julius Nyerere (BBC, 2009), and the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986. The “Policy of Confinement” was adopted in 1972 as one of the cornerstones for implementing the Arusha Declaration. This policy as the name suggests nationalised and protected Tanzania’s trade from the international market through direct government intervention in the form of administrative resource, price controls, import quotas, rationing and the use of permits. This policy by the beginning of the 1980s led to inefficient resource allocation and inability to mobilise adequate resources due to government intervention and controls. It resulted in lack of competition in the financial system and the collapse of the credit system due to the emergence of inefficient payment system. As a result of the nationalisation of foreign and domestic trade, investments and assets there was a decline in private sector activity and Foreign Direct Investment (Ngasongwa, 2003: 5-6).
Globalisation goes with free trade and a country which closes its market finds it difficult to develop since there is no market to compete with the domestic market which can result in cheap price of goods and services. Tanzania realised the need for an open market and embarked on market liberalisation with the initial trade policy in the form of informal trade liberalisation measures starting in 1984 and based on import liberalisation and liberalisation of exchange controls (ibid)
The latest trade policy of the country is the National Trade Policy (NTP), 2003 which forms part of Tanzania’s Vision 2025 agenda aimed at helping the country to become a middle income earner. The aim of the NTB as stated by the Minister of Trade is ‘to facilitate smooth integration into the Multilateral Trading System and roll back the gradual descent towards marginalisation. It is intended to ensure that liberalisation offers meaningful, identifiable and measurable benefits’ (Ngasongwa, 2003: i). The private sector is considered as important in the NTP as it is seen as the lead implementer, the economic agent responsible for the production of goods and services that will enable Tanzania to take its rightful place in the global market. For the country to benefit from free trade, as argued by Chang (2002; 2008), domestic market should be competitive to compete with the goods and services from the global market. Tanzania like any other developing country faces the problem of advance technology to process the many agricultural products to meet international standard to enjoy the economies of scales associated with them. The main challenge faced by Tanzania according to Ngasongwa (2003: 3) ‘is how to enhance the competiveness of the domestic firms and entrepreneurs’.
Tanzania has been progressing steadily towards political stability and strong economic trade growth. Successful macroeconomic stabilisation and the implementation of a broad range of structural reforms have resulted in steady acceleration in economic growth during the past decade. The impact of trade policies on Tanzania includes the following:
I. The country has been generating about 6% GDP growth on average since 2000 and sectoral growth rate has accelerated across the board during the past decades
II. Agriculture is still the most important sector with an average growth of 4.9% during the last five years.
III. Rapid expansion has also been seen in the mining and construction sectors from 10.9% between 1991-1995 to 15.7% between 2001-2006 for mining (Levin and Ohlin, 2008: 7)
IV. In 2008 an estimated $2.49 billion was realised from export trade (C.I. A, 2009). About half of this profit came from the agricultural exports or trade where most of the citizens obtain their “daily bread” and this may also mean an improvement in the living standard of people.
V. The NTP, 2003 also liberalised the Tanzanian domestic market opening it to investment and as a result creating employment since FDI’s are welcome to operate in the country due to the removal or reduction of government intervention and others (Levin and Ohlin, 2008).
Trade policies have had negative effect on the country as well, especially the NTB which has brought about greater liberalisation and this was greatly felt in the current recession. One of the affected areas includes the textile and garment manufacturing industries. Sunflag a textile manufacturing company has reduced the number of days and hours of workers and has even laid some off. There has been a fall in its recruitment since the volume of garment production has fallen by 30% due to the reluctance of buyers from US and Europe to buy (Young, 2009).
The country should not be too much open to the global market as this is one of its weakness caused by its inability to compete strongly with international competitors. As argued by Chang (2008:66), ‘they need time to improve their capabilities by mastering advanced technologies and building effective organizations’.
To end the researcher suggests Tanzania should concentrate not only on the agriculture sector but improve on its performance in other sectors of trade to benefit the country and not to limit it to just one sector.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
British Broadcasting Corporation (2009) Country Profile: Tanzania. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072330.stm (Accessed: 16 May 2009)
Central Intelligence Academy (2009) Tanzania. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html (Accessed: 16 May 2009)
Chang, H.-J. (2002) Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, London: Anthem Press
(2008) Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
Levin, J. and Ohlin, M. (2008) Trade Policies and Export Growth: Employment and Poverty Impact in Tanzania. Stockholm: SIDA Publication Inc.
Ngasongwa, J.A (2003) National Trade Policy: Trade Policy for a Competitive Economy and Export-Led Growth. Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Industry and Trade
Young, R. (2009) Tanzania’s Textile Trade Unravels. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7935273.stm (Accessed: 16 April 2009)
Tanzania was formed through the 1964 merger between Tanganyika and Zanzibar both of which were colonies of Britain and had their independence in 1961 and 1963 respectively. The country‘s economy is highly dependent on the agriculture sector where eighty percent of the population depends and contributes about 50% to GDP and 70% of earnings from merchandise exports (Ngasongwa, 2003: 4; C.I.A, 2009; Levin and Ohlin, 2008). The researcher found out that most of the country’s export were and are still from the agriculture sector which includes cotton, tea, coffee, tobacco, cashew nuts and other processed and unprocessed agriculture products. Tanzania’s main trading and export partners as at 2007 are UAE 4.9%, Germany 6.5%, India - 9.7% and China - 10.3% (C.I.A, 2009).
Since independence in 1964, Tanzania has pursued a number of trade policies including the famous Arusha Declaration in 1967 by the first president Julius Nyerere (BBC, 2009), and the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986. The “Policy of Confinement” was adopted in 1972 as one of the cornerstones for implementing the Arusha Declaration. This policy as the name suggests nationalised and protected Tanzania’s trade from the international market through direct government intervention in the form of administrative resource, price controls, import quotas, rationing and the use of permits. This policy by the beginning of the 1980s led to inefficient resource allocation and inability to mobilise adequate resources due to government intervention and controls. It resulted in lack of competition in the financial system and the collapse of the credit system due to the emergence of inefficient payment system. As a result of the nationalisation of foreign and domestic trade, investments and assets there was a decline in private sector activity and Foreign Direct Investment (Ngasongwa, 2003: 5-6).
Globalisation goes with free trade and a country which closes its market finds it difficult to develop since there is no market to compete with the domestic market which can result in cheap price of goods and services. Tanzania realised the need for an open market and embarked on market liberalisation with the initial trade policy in the form of informal trade liberalisation measures starting in 1984 and based on import liberalisation and liberalisation of exchange controls (ibid)
The latest trade policy of the country is the National Trade Policy (NTP), 2003 which forms part of Tanzania’s Vision 2025 agenda aimed at helping the country to become a middle income earner. The aim of the NTB as stated by the Minister of Trade is ‘to facilitate smooth integration into the Multilateral Trading System and roll back the gradual descent towards marginalisation. It is intended to ensure that liberalisation offers meaningful, identifiable and measurable benefits’ (Ngasongwa, 2003: i). The private sector is considered as important in the NTP as it is seen as the lead implementer, the economic agent responsible for the production of goods and services that will enable Tanzania to take its rightful place in the global market. For the country to benefit from free trade, as argued by Chang (2002; 2008), domestic market should be competitive to compete with the goods and services from the global market. Tanzania like any other developing country faces the problem of advance technology to process the many agricultural products to meet international standard to enjoy the economies of scales associated with them. The main challenge faced by Tanzania according to Ngasongwa (2003: 3) ‘is how to enhance the competiveness of the domestic firms and entrepreneurs’.
Tanzania has been progressing steadily towards political stability and strong economic trade growth. Successful macroeconomic stabilisation and the implementation of a broad range of structural reforms have resulted in steady acceleration in economic growth during the past decade. The impact of trade policies on Tanzania includes the following:
I. The country has been generating about 6% GDP growth on average since 2000 and sectoral growth rate has accelerated across the board during the past decades
II. Agriculture is still the most important sector with an average growth of 4.9% during the last five years.
III. Rapid expansion has also been seen in the mining and construction sectors from 10.9% between 1991-1995 to 15.7% between 2001-2006 for mining (Levin and Ohlin, 2008: 7)
IV. In 2008 an estimated $2.49 billion was realised from export trade (C.I. A, 2009). About half of this profit came from the agricultural exports or trade where most of the citizens obtain their “daily bread” and this may also mean an improvement in the living standard of people.
V. The NTP, 2003 also liberalised the Tanzanian domestic market opening it to investment and as a result creating employment since FDI’s are welcome to operate in the country due to the removal or reduction of government intervention and others (Levin and Ohlin, 2008).
Trade policies have had negative effect on the country as well, especially the NTB which has brought about greater liberalisation and this was greatly felt in the current recession. One of the affected areas includes the textile and garment manufacturing industries. Sunflag a textile manufacturing company has reduced the number of days and hours of workers and has even laid some off. There has been a fall in its recruitment since the volume of garment production has fallen by 30% due to the reluctance of buyers from US and Europe to buy (Young, 2009).
The country should not be too much open to the global market as this is one of its weakness caused by its inability to compete strongly with international competitors. As argued by Chang (2008:66), ‘they need time to improve their capabilities by mastering advanced technologies and building effective organizations’.
To end the researcher suggests Tanzania should concentrate not only on the agriculture sector but improve on its performance in other sectors of trade to benefit the country and not to limit it to just one sector.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
British Broadcasting Corporation (2009) Country Profile: Tanzania. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072330.stm (Accessed: 16 May 2009)
Central Intelligence Academy (2009) Tanzania. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html (Accessed: 16 May 2009)
Chang, H.-J. (2002) Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, London: Anthem Press
(2008) Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
Levin, J. and Ohlin, M. (2008) Trade Policies and Export Growth: Employment and Poverty Impact in Tanzania. Stockholm: SIDA Publication Inc.
Ngasongwa, J.A (2003) National Trade Policy: Trade Policy for a Competitive Economy and Export-Led Growth. Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Industry and Trade
Young, R. (2009) Tanzania’s Textile Trade Unravels. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7935273.stm (Accessed: 16 April 2009)
The Conflict in North-Eastern Sri Lanka (Vanni)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This is a briefing report on the on-going conflict in Sri Lanka, which has been going on for more than twenty-five years between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE). The conflict has claimed thousands of lives and resulted in lot of civilian casualties which has led to the creation of Internally Displaced People (IDP’s). Both government and the LTTE have been accused of human rights violation since their continuous engagement has resulted in many atrocities meted on the innocent civilian population in the affected areas and regions. The LTTE is accused of using civilians as human shields and terrorist tactics in their controlled territories.
This report looks at the on-going conflict in the Vanni Region taking into account the root or background, nature and effects of the conflict. Much is reported on the violations of civilian rights which should be protected during internal armed conflict as enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Convention and its 1977 Additional Protocol especially common Article 3. The activities of the LTTE, described as terrorist acts and its use of terrorism are discussed in the briefing as well as the abuses carried out by the government forces in the enclave area. The Vanni Region where the government has declared “a no-fire zone o safe zone” comprises parts of the districts of Kilinochchi (to the north), Mullaitivu (east), Mannar (west) and Vavuniya (south).
The finding of the report is civilians have become targets for both government and LTTE attacks as even government declared “no fire zones” are subjected to frequent attacks. It makes recommendation that the situation pertaining in Sri Lanka should be seriously considered by the international community to prevent it from developing into genocide and also culprits should be brought to book to face the rigours of law. The UN Security Council should put much pressure on both the Tamil Tigers and the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to observe a cease fire to bring an end to gruesome and enormous killings in the country.
INTRODUCTION
After almost 450 years of colonial rule by various western powers Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948 and its former name Ceylon was changed to the current name (Spence, 1990:1; ICG, 2008). The country has been a destination for many tourists and also seen as one of South Asia’s potentially prosperous societies but the country since 1983 has been rocked by the fierce conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE which is fighting for a self-ruled Tamil State in the northern and eastern part of the country. This briefing focus on the on-going conflict in the north-eastern part of the country especially in the Vanni Region where more than 200,000 civilians have been trapped in the fatal confrontation between the LTTE and the GoSL (HRW, 2009: 5; AI, 2009). The on-going conflict between the above parties brings to light a lot of issues that arises with reference to contemporary conflict, which this briefing brings to the attention of the reader. Issues such as refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s), Terrorism which the rebel or militant group LTTE is accused of due to the nature of its activities which targets civilians. Efforts have been made to bring the two parties to ‘smoke the peace pipe’ through signing of ceasefire agreements but to no avail. The GoSL withdrawn from the last truce which was signed in 2002 on 16 January 2008 and fighting between the parties have intensified since late December 2008 and the beginning of 2009 (ICG, 2008: 2). The intensification of the fighting between the government forces and the LTTE has led to civilians trapped in the north-eastern part of the country and those trying to escape from this part controlled by the rebels (LTTE) are fired at killing them. They have been used as human shields by the LTTE and the government is also accused of indiscriminate shelling of densely populated civilian areas.
The information for the briefing were gathered from diverse sources including reports by various international organisations such as Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and International Crisis Group (ICG), news from the government site (PRIU), and academic book. This methodology adopted helped in getting a fair idea of the happenings in the conflict due to the refusal of the government to allow human rights organisation and the media access to the area making information gathering difficult. And also since it is an on-going conflict much have not been written on it and as such the need to use websites dedicated to conflict issues.
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
The Sri Lankan conflict is believed to have its root in the marginalisation of the 18% Tamils by the 74% Sinhala majority after independence. Laws discriminating against the 18% Tamil and the 6% Muslims were passed including the 1956 Act, which made Sinhala the official language and the 1972 Constitution, which also gave Buddhism a ‘foremost place’ in state (ICG, 2008; Spencer, 1990: 2). The discriminatory policies were made during the time and rule of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which was a coalition of a number of Sinhala-dominated parties led by the charismatic leader S.W.R.D Bandaranaike. This created a lot of resentment among the Tamils who taught it wise to fight for their rights as citizens leading to many confrontations between the GoSL and different Tamil organisations or groups which emerged.
Various Tamil groups have emerged in Sri Lanka since 1956 fighting for a separate state administered by the Tamils; thus groups that are focused on the secession of the minority Tamil have emerged and have used various means to fight the government. Some of these groups include the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), whose main policy was the separatism and the formation of a new state of ‘Eelam’ and became the official opposition party after the 1977 elections (ibid). From the mid 1970s strong militant Tamil groups sprang up and embarked on atrocious and fatal campaigns aimed at the independence of the Tamil minority and the most threatening among them was the LTTE. The LTTE firstly embarked on a policy of terrorist attacks that targeted the representatives of the Sinhala-dominated government. These terrorist attacks included the use of suicide bombing, massacres, disappearances and kidnapping (Spencer, 1990:2-3).
Nissan and Stirrat (1990: 39), believes that the conflict has its roots in the processes, which was set in motion during the colonial era. The processes included; the unification of the island under British rule, the foreword of a unitary bureaucratic structure and appurtenances of the modern state.
TERRORISM, VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OF WAR AND ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE LTTE
The Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) intensified its attacks in 1983 after thousands of Tamils were killed in the rioting in the Sinhala-dominated south. The death of the thousand Tamils was as result of the killings of the thirteen soldiers in the northern town of Jaffna by militant Tamil group (Spencer, 1990: 2; ICG, 2008). Since then their attacks on government representatives shifted to attacks on civilians in the form of suicide bombings, massacres, kidnapping, forced recruitment of children as child soldiers all aimed at achieving their goal of an independent Tamil state (ICG, 2008: 2). The current conflict between the GoSL forces and the rebel group has reviewed many violations of the Laws of war and the use of terrorist mechanisms by the group. Their claim of protecting the Tamil minorities in the country has led to many violations of civilian human rights; thus the protector of rights has turned out to be the violator of these rights. Since they started their war with the GoSL aimed at acquiring an independent Tamil State the group activities have witnessed some gruesome and traumatic human rights violations. The north-eastern part of the country is occupied by the minority Tamils and as such should be properly guarded and protected by the LTTE who claim to fight for the independence of the Tamils. If this is the case, why are they using civilians (fellow Tamils) as human shields in their fight with the government forces resulting in the death and injuries of civilians? The LTTE according to a statement by Ambassador Claude Heller, President of the UN Security Council is “a terrorist organization and should be condemned for its use of civilian as a human shield. The LTTE should immediately lay down arms and renounce its terror tactics” (PRIU, 2009). Human Shielding arises when combatants deliberately use civilians to protect their positions from attack which is a war crime or violation of the laws of war and this is exactly what the LTTE is doing.
The activities of the LTTE violate protocol II of the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention. Part II of Protocol II which, is related to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflict talks about ‘humane treatment’. It is against the taking of hostages, collective punishment, acts of terrorism, and pillage. It also frowns on violence to life, health, and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as rape, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment (UNHCHR, 2002). Civilians who are not supposed to be held as hostages during internal armed conflicts or any other conflict have been trapped in the Vanni Region and held as hostages by the LTTE violating Article 4(2c) of Protocol II. They are not just held as hostages by the group but are also used as human shields against the missiles, shells or artilleries from the government forces. Those who manage to escape are shot at by the LTTE rebels and this put fear into those trapped in the region. This is one of the mechanisms used by terrorist groups and the LTTE seen as a terrorist organisation by the international community such as the UN and EU is capitalising on this mechanism terrifying and putting fear into these innocent civilians.
The Civilians under the effective control of the LTTE have been deliberately prevented from fleeing to “safe zones” and this unnecessarily and unlawfully places their lives at grave risk. The LTTE fleeing from the recent upsurge and incursions by government forces retreated with these trapped civilians prolonging the danger they face (HRW, 2005: 5; AI, 2009). They are not only prolonging the danger faced by these civilians but are also moving them further away from desperately needed humanitarian assistance. The areas under the control of the LTTE is shrinking due to these offensive operations by government forces and this increases the risk of high casualties in the event of an attack as well as placing greater strains on the living conditions of the civilians. This is because the trapped civilian population have been concentrated in these small LTTE contracted areas. According to the IDPs who arrived in Vavuniya on February 9, the LTTE used this tactics when they were retreating in the Suthanthirapam area. They tried to push back civilians to prevent them from fleeing to the government side by opening fire on them injuring 17. In another development LTTE cadres fired on civilians crossing the frontline in Moongkilaaru injuring and killing an unknown number of civilians (HRW, 2009: 6-7).
The group has also embarked on forced recruitment of children under fifteen as child soldiers despite the many pledges to the UN and others not to do so (ICG, 2008: ii) to fight against the government forces, which also violates Article 4(3c) of protocol II (UNHCHR, 2002). They have been using children under the age of 18 and untrained together with other civilians who are forced to join them also untrained to combat the GoSL forces. It has since September 2008 forced a lot of children and civilians with no prior military training and experience to battle or to carry out supportive functions on the frontline against government forces (HRW, 2009: 9). In so doing these guiltless children are exposed to many things which tend to have adverse effects on them. In their new engagement as soldiers they are trained to kill and use heavy weapons and this put them into some trauma since they come face to face with death. Some of the activities performed by those on the frontline include digging of bunkers, collection of weapons from killed LTTE cadres and GoSL forces (ibid). The UNICEF has expressed its gravest concern about this situation through a statement by Mr. Philippe Duamelle (UNICEF Sri Lanka Representative). “We have clear indications that the LTTE has intensified forcible recruitment of civilians and that children as young as 14 years old are now being targeted. These children are facing immediate danger and their lives are at great risk. Their recruitment is intolerable” (UNICEF, 2009).
Combatants tend to fight or carry on to battle when they are obsessed with “false optimism”; thus when they exaggerate their chances of winning crises and conflicts, or even whey they underestimate the cost of conflict (Van Evera, 1999: 5,14-17). This is the situation that the LTTE now find itself as it thought it could overpower GoSL forces but has turned to be an illusion and even have lost their administrative, centre to the GoSL forces (HRW, 2009: 2)
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW BY GOVERNMENT
During internal armed conflicts governments are envisaged to protect civilians from the atrocities that may come as a result of the conflict. In the case of the on-going Sri Lankan conflict the government has ‘soiled his hands’ with some of the gruesome activities or crimes of conflicts. These violations include shelling of densely populated areas occupied by trapped civilians, bombardments, detention of civilians who manage to escape areas of hostility to government “safety zones” and attacks on declared government “safety zones” and hospitals (AI, 2009). Instead of finding ways and means of protecting civilians from human rights abuses as prescribed by international law regarding conflicts, the government is defending itself of not attacking civilians but LTTE. It also holds the view that all persons subjected to attacks from the GoSL forces are legitimate LTTE targets since they have refused to flee to the “safety zones” (HRW, 2009: 19-20; AI, 2009). But how can these civilians flee to these zones if they are trapped by the LTTE. Below details some of the violations carried out by the government on the civilians.
Attacks on Hospitals: Hospitals in and around the conflict zones have not been left out from attacks by government forces as they have been either partly or wholly destroyed by bombardments. Hospitals in LTTE controlled areas have come under attack increasing the plight of the conflict affected civilians who seek medical attention from these hospitals. Hospitals that are partly hurt by the conflict lack medical personnel, equipments and medical supplies and their situation is made worse by the overcrowded civilian seeking medical attention (HRW, 2009:16).
Like other civilian objects that may not be targeted during conflicts, Hospitals are uniquely protected by international humanitarian laws. They remain secured and protected during conflict unless they are used to commit hostile acts. Government deliberate attacks on hospitals are therefore a crime against the laws governing conflicts. According HRW (2009: 18), between 15 December 2008 and 10 February 2009 government shelling and bombardments on and around nine hospitals have resulted in 55 deaths and 165 injuries including medical staff with Puthukkudiyiruppu (PTK) being the worst hit. This does not even reflect the correct figures and would be more since some of the casualties were not recorded, which can be ascribe to government restriction on the flow of information as stated earlier.
Indiscriminate Attacks: The GoSL force has been accused by international organisations such as AI, HRW and ICG of indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Concerns have been raised about the kind of artilleries used in carrying out these attacks which violates the laws of war. (AI, 2009; HRW, 2009: 11-13; ICG, 2008: 18) The forces are using multi-barrel rocket launchers. These weapons are used in populated areas and this makes it use indiscriminate. This is because “Multi-barrel rocket launchers cannot be targeted with sufficient precision to be accurate against military targets, and their broad effect makes their use incompatible with the laws of war in areas where civilians or civilian objects … are located”(HRW, 2009: 12). These indiscriminate attacks have resulted in the amputation of hands and legs of civilians, deaths and creation of a turmoil environment. These indiscriminate attacks and shelling by the GoSL forces does not only affect the civilian populations but also aid workers since they do not have access to these areas to administer the needed help to the affected civilians. They are in dire need of food, medicines, blankets but the continual attacks and shelling prevent these aid agencies from going to these areas. This can lead to an increase in preventable deaths caused by injuries sustained from these attacks.
Attacks on Safe Zones: The “safe zones” which was declared by the government on 21st February 2009 have also come under government shelling and attacks. The “safe zone” which was unilaterally declared by the GoSL forces between the Udayarkattu junction and Manjal Palaam also serve as food distribution centre for Local government agents and international organisations. This place should be pardon in the government quest to cramp down on the LTTE but it has come under constant attacks living behind many civilian casualties. According to a report by TamilNet (2009), government shelling into the “safety zones” killed 71 civilians and injured 143 civilians. The pathetic aspect of this attack on the “safety zones” was the injury sustained by a one month baby. Attack on “safety zones” violates laws of conflict and as such the government forces are seriously violating these laws.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The conflict in the Vanni region has reviewed worse human rights abuses and violations of human rights which call for the massive involvement of the international community to safeguard the deteriorated situation. There has been a total disregard for the laws governing internal armed conflict by both the LTTE and the GoSL forces, who are using humans as shield and shelling densely populated civilian areas resulting in casualties. The briefing has been able to identify some of the violations that are been carried out which are all contrary to the laws of war and as such appropriate measures should be taken to bring the conflict to a halt so that civilians can enjoy their fundamental human rights. To conclude the following recommendations have been made for the government, LTTE and the international community.
Government
I. The government should do everything within its powers to protect civilians from the effects of the conflict by restricting its military attacks to international law governing internal armed conflicts.
II. The government should allow humanitarian organisations access to areas where civilians are in dire need of humanitarian assistance such as food, water, medicine and blankets.
III. It should embark on full investigation into the conflict to investigate all the human rights abuses, disappearances and killings by both LTTE and GoSL forces
IV. The government should seek for new ways of ending the conflict instead of using prohibited weapons which infringes on the rights and liberties of civilians.
LTTE
I. The LTTE should refrain from stopping and shooting civilians fleeing from their controlled zones.
II. A stop should be put on the false recruitment of civilians and the use of children as soldiers battling government forces.
III. Civilians should not be used as human shields in their fight with the GoSL forces.
IV. The LTTE should allow humanitarian workers access to their controlled zones.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Amnesty International (2009) Civilian Casualties Continue to Mount In Sri Lanka. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/civilian-casualties-continue-mount-sri-lanka-20090424 (Accessed: 27 April 2009)
Human Rights Watch (2009) War on the Displaced: Sri Lanka Army and LTTE Abuses against Civilians in Vanni. New York: HRW Publications; February 2009
International Crisis Group (2008) Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage. Brussels: Crisis Group Media. (Asia Report No 146)
Nissan, E. and Stirrat, R.L (1990) ‘The Generation of Communal Identities’, in Spencer, J. (ed.) Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict. London: Routledge, pp
PRIU (2009) Lay Down Arms, Renounce Terror – UN to LTTE. Available at: http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200904/20090423lay_down_arms_renounce_terror.htm (Accessed: 23 April 2009)
TamilNet (2009) SLA Intensifies Attacks on Safe Zone, 71 Civilians Killed, 143 Wounded. Available at: http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=28950 (Accessed: 5 April 2009)
UNHCR (2002) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/94.htm (Accessed: 20 February 2009)
UNICEF (2009) Sri Lanka: More Children Victims of the Conflict, Says UNICEF. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/media/media_48044.html (Accessed: 23 February 2009)
Van Evera, S. (1999) Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
This is a briefing report on the on-going conflict in Sri Lanka, which has been going on for more than twenty-five years between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE). The conflict has claimed thousands of lives and resulted in lot of civilian casualties which has led to the creation of Internally Displaced People (IDP’s). Both government and the LTTE have been accused of human rights violation since their continuous engagement has resulted in many atrocities meted on the innocent civilian population in the affected areas and regions. The LTTE is accused of using civilians as human shields and terrorist tactics in their controlled territories.
This report looks at the on-going conflict in the Vanni Region taking into account the root or background, nature and effects of the conflict. Much is reported on the violations of civilian rights which should be protected during internal armed conflict as enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Convention and its 1977 Additional Protocol especially common Article 3. The activities of the LTTE, described as terrorist acts and its use of terrorism are discussed in the briefing as well as the abuses carried out by the government forces in the enclave area. The Vanni Region where the government has declared “a no-fire zone o safe zone” comprises parts of the districts of Kilinochchi (to the north), Mullaitivu (east), Mannar (west) and Vavuniya (south).
The finding of the report is civilians have become targets for both government and LTTE attacks as even government declared “no fire zones” are subjected to frequent attacks. It makes recommendation that the situation pertaining in Sri Lanka should be seriously considered by the international community to prevent it from developing into genocide and also culprits should be brought to book to face the rigours of law. The UN Security Council should put much pressure on both the Tamil Tigers and the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to observe a cease fire to bring an end to gruesome and enormous killings in the country.
INTRODUCTION
After almost 450 years of colonial rule by various western powers Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948 and its former name Ceylon was changed to the current name (Spence, 1990:1; ICG, 2008). The country has been a destination for many tourists and also seen as one of South Asia’s potentially prosperous societies but the country since 1983 has been rocked by the fierce conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE which is fighting for a self-ruled Tamil State in the northern and eastern part of the country. This briefing focus on the on-going conflict in the north-eastern part of the country especially in the Vanni Region where more than 200,000 civilians have been trapped in the fatal confrontation between the LTTE and the GoSL (HRW, 2009: 5; AI, 2009). The on-going conflict between the above parties brings to light a lot of issues that arises with reference to contemporary conflict, which this briefing brings to the attention of the reader. Issues such as refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s), Terrorism which the rebel or militant group LTTE is accused of due to the nature of its activities which targets civilians. Efforts have been made to bring the two parties to ‘smoke the peace pipe’ through signing of ceasefire agreements but to no avail. The GoSL withdrawn from the last truce which was signed in 2002 on 16 January 2008 and fighting between the parties have intensified since late December 2008 and the beginning of 2009 (ICG, 2008: 2). The intensification of the fighting between the government forces and the LTTE has led to civilians trapped in the north-eastern part of the country and those trying to escape from this part controlled by the rebels (LTTE) are fired at killing them. They have been used as human shields by the LTTE and the government is also accused of indiscriminate shelling of densely populated civilian areas.
The information for the briefing were gathered from diverse sources including reports by various international organisations such as Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and International Crisis Group (ICG), news from the government site (PRIU), and academic book. This methodology adopted helped in getting a fair idea of the happenings in the conflict due to the refusal of the government to allow human rights organisation and the media access to the area making information gathering difficult. And also since it is an on-going conflict much have not been written on it and as such the need to use websites dedicated to conflict issues.
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
The Sri Lankan conflict is believed to have its root in the marginalisation of the 18% Tamils by the 74% Sinhala majority after independence. Laws discriminating against the 18% Tamil and the 6% Muslims were passed including the 1956 Act, which made Sinhala the official language and the 1972 Constitution, which also gave Buddhism a ‘foremost place’ in state (ICG, 2008; Spencer, 1990: 2). The discriminatory policies were made during the time and rule of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which was a coalition of a number of Sinhala-dominated parties led by the charismatic leader S.W.R.D Bandaranaike. This created a lot of resentment among the Tamils who taught it wise to fight for their rights as citizens leading to many confrontations between the GoSL and different Tamil organisations or groups which emerged.
Various Tamil groups have emerged in Sri Lanka since 1956 fighting for a separate state administered by the Tamils; thus groups that are focused on the secession of the minority Tamil have emerged and have used various means to fight the government. Some of these groups include the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), whose main policy was the separatism and the formation of a new state of ‘Eelam’ and became the official opposition party after the 1977 elections (ibid). From the mid 1970s strong militant Tamil groups sprang up and embarked on atrocious and fatal campaigns aimed at the independence of the Tamil minority and the most threatening among them was the LTTE. The LTTE firstly embarked on a policy of terrorist attacks that targeted the representatives of the Sinhala-dominated government. These terrorist attacks included the use of suicide bombing, massacres, disappearances and kidnapping (Spencer, 1990:2-3).
Nissan and Stirrat (1990: 39), believes that the conflict has its roots in the processes, which was set in motion during the colonial era. The processes included; the unification of the island under British rule, the foreword of a unitary bureaucratic structure and appurtenances of the modern state.
TERRORISM, VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OF WAR AND ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE LTTE
The Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) intensified its attacks in 1983 after thousands of Tamils were killed in the rioting in the Sinhala-dominated south. The death of the thousand Tamils was as result of the killings of the thirteen soldiers in the northern town of Jaffna by militant Tamil group (Spencer, 1990: 2; ICG, 2008). Since then their attacks on government representatives shifted to attacks on civilians in the form of suicide bombings, massacres, kidnapping, forced recruitment of children as child soldiers all aimed at achieving their goal of an independent Tamil state (ICG, 2008: 2). The current conflict between the GoSL forces and the rebel group has reviewed many violations of the Laws of war and the use of terrorist mechanisms by the group. Their claim of protecting the Tamil minorities in the country has led to many violations of civilian human rights; thus the protector of rights has turned out to be the violator of these rights. Since they started their war with the GoSL aimed at acquiring an independent Tamil State the group activities have witnessed some gruesome and traumatic human rights violations. The north-eastern part of the country is occupied by the minority Tamils and as such should be properly guarded and protected by the LTTE who claim to fight for the independence of the Tamils. If this is the case, why are they using civilians (fellow Tamils) as human shields in their fight with the government forces resulting in the death and injuries of civilians? The LTTE according to a statement by Ambassador Claude Heller, President of the UN Security Council is “a terrorist organization and should be condemned for its use of civilian as a human shield. The LTTE should immediately lay down arms and renounce its terror tactics” (PRIU, 2009). Human Shielding arises when combatants deliberately use civilians to protect their positions from attack which is a war crime or violation of the laws of war and this is exactly what the LTTE is doing.
The activities of the LTTE violate protocol II of the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention. Part II of Protocol II which, is related to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflict talks about ‘humane treatment’. It is against the taking of hostages, collective punishment, acts of terrorism, and pillage. It also frowns on violence to life, health, and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as rape, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment (UNHCHR, 2002). Civilians who are not supposed to be held as hostages during internal armed conflicts or any other conflict have been trapped in the Vanni Region and held as hostages by the LTTE violating Article 4(2c) of Protocol II. They are not just held as hostages by the group but are also used as human shields against the missiles, shells or artilleries from the government forces. Those who manage to escape are shot at by the LTTE rebels and this put fear into those trapped in the region. This is one of the mechanisms used by terrorist groups and the LTTE seen as a terrorist organisation by the international community such as the UN and EU is capitalising on this mechanism terrifying and putting fear into these innocent civilians.
The Civilians under the effective control of the LTTE have been deliberately prevented from fleeing to “safe zones” and this unnecessarily and unlawfully places their lives at grave risk. The LTTE fleeing from the recent upsurge and incursions by government forces retreated with these trapped civilians prolonging the danger they face (HRW, 2005: 5; AI, 2009). They are not only prolonging the danger faced by these civilians but are also moving them further away from desperately needed humanitarian assistance. The areas under the control of the LTTE is shrinking due to these offensive operations by government forces and this increases the risk of high casualties in the event of an attack as well as placing greater strains on the living conditions of the civilians. This is because the trapped civilian population have been concentrated in these small LTTE contracted areas. According to the IDPs who arrived in Vavuniya on February 9, the LTTE used this tactics when they were retreating in the Suthanthirapam area. They tried to push back civilians to prevent them from fleeing to the government side by opening fire on them injuring 17. In another development LTTE cadres fired on civilians crossing the frontline in Moongkilaaru injuring and killing an unknown number of civilians (HRW, 2009: 6-7).
The group has also embarked on forced recruitment of children under fifteen as child soldiers despite the many pledges to the UN and others not to do so (ICG, 2008: ii) to fight against the government forces, which also violates Article 4(3c) of protocol II (UNHCHR, 2002). They have been using children under the age of 18 and untrained together with other civilians who are forced to join them also untrained to combat the GoSL forces. It has since September 2008 forced a lot of children and civilians with no prior military training and experience to battle or to carry out supportive functions on the frontline against government forces (HRW, 2009: 9). In so doing these guiltless children are exposed to many things which tend to have adverse effects on them. In their new engagement as soldiers they are trained to kill and use heavy weapons and this put them into some trauma since they come face to face with death. Some of the activities performed by those on the frontline include digging of bunkers, collection of weapons from killed LTTE cadres and GoSL forces (ibid). The UNICEF has expressed its gravest concern about this situation through a statement by Mr. Philippe Duamelle (UNICEF Sri Lanka Representative). “We have clear indications that the LTTE has intensified forcible recruitment of civilians and that children as young as 14 years old are now being targeted. These children are facing immediate danger and their lives are at great risk. Their recruitment is intolerable” (UNICEF, 2009).
Combatants tend to fight or carry on to battle when they are obsessed with “false optimism”; thus when they exaggerate their chances of winning crises and conflicts, or even whey they underestimate the cost of conflict (Van Evera, 1999: 5,14-17). This is the situation that the LTTE now find itself as it thought it could overpower GoSL forces but has turned to be an illusion and even have lost their administrative, centre to the GoSL forces (HRW, 2009: 2)
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW BY GOVERNMENT
During internal armed conflicts governments are envisaged to protect civilians from the atrocities that may come as a result of the conflict. In the case of the on-going Sri Lankan conflict the government has ‘soiled his hands’ with some of the gruesome activities or crimes of conflicts. These violations include shelling of densely populated areas occupied by trapped civilians, bombardments, detention of civilians who manage to escape areas of hostility to government “safety zones” and attacks on declared government “safety zones” and hospitals (AI, 2009). Instead of finding ways and means of protecting civilians from human rights abuses as prescribed by international law regarding conflicts, the government is defending itself of not attacking civilians but LTTE. It also holds the view that all persons subjected to attacks from the GoSL forces are legitimate LTTE targets since they have refused to flee to the “safety zones” (HRW, 2009: 19-20; AI, 2009). But how can these civilians flee to these zones if they are trapped by the LTTE. Below details some of the violations carried out by the government on the civilians.
Attacks on Hospitals: Hospitals in and around the conflict zones have not been left out from attacks by government forces as they have been either partly or wholly destroyed by bombardments. Hospitals in LTTE controlled areas have come under attack increasing the plight of the conflict affected civilians who seek medical attention from these hospitals. Hospitals that are partly hurt by the conflict lack medical personnel, equipments and medical supplies and their situation is made worse by the overcrowded civilian seeking medical attention (HRW, 2009:16).
Like other civilian objects that may not be targeted during conflicts, Hospitals are uniquely protected by international humanitarian laws. They remain secured and protected during conflict unless they are used to commit hostile acts. Government deliberate attacks on hospitals are therefore a crime against the laws governing conflicts. According HRW (2009: 18), between 15 December 2008 and 10 February 2009 government shelling and bombardments on and around nine hospitals have resulted in 55 deaths and 165 injuries including medical staff with Puthukkudiyiruppu (PTK) being the worst hit. This does not even reflect the correct figures and would be more since some of the casualties were not recorded, which can be ascribe to government restriction on the flow of information as stated earlier.
Indiscriminate Attacks: The GoSL force has been accused by international organisations such as AI, HRW and ICG of indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Concerns have been raised about the kind of artilleries used in carrying out these attacks which violates the laws of war. (AI, 2009; HRW, 2009: 11-13; ICG, 2008: 18) The forces are using multi-barrel rocket launchers. These weapons are used in populated areas and this makes it use indiscriminate. This is because “Multi-barrel rocket launchers cannot be targeted with sufficient precision to be accurate against military targets, and their broad effect makes their use incompatible with the laws of war in areas where civilians or civilian objects … are located”(HRW, 2009: 12). These indiscriminate attacks have resulted in the amputation of hands and legs of civilians, deaths and creation of a turmoil environment. These indiscriminate attacks and shelling by the GoSL forces does not only affect the civilian populations but also aid workers since they do not have access to these areas to administer the needed help to the affected civilians. They are in dire need of food, medicines, blankets but the continual attacks and shelling prevent these aid agencies from going to these areas. This can lead to an increase in preventable deaths caused by injuries sustained from these attacks.
Attacks on Safe Zones: The “safe zones” which was declared by the government on 21st February 2009 have also come under government shelling and attacks. The “safe zone” which was unilaterally declared by the GoSL forces between the Udayarkattu junction and Manjal Palaam also serve as food distribution centre for Local government agents and international organisations. This place should be pardon in the government quest to cramp down on the LTTE but it has come under constant attacks living behind many civilian casualties. According to a report by TamilNet (2009), government shelling into the “safety zones” killed 71 civilians and injured 143 civilians. The pathetic aspect of this attack on the “safety zones” was the injury sustained by a one month baby. Attack on “safety zones” violates laws of conflict and as such the government forces are seriously violating these laws.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The conflict in the Vanni region has reviewed worse human rights abuses and violations of human rights which call for the massive involvement of the international community to safeguard the deteriorated situation. There has been a total disregard for the laws governing internal armed conflict by both the LTTE and the GoSL forces, who are using humans as shield and shelling densely populated civilian areas resulting in casualties. The briefing has been able to identify some of the violations that are been carried out which are all contrary to the laws of war and as such appropriate measures should be taken to bring the conflict to a halt so that civilians can enjoy their fundamental human rights. To conclude the following recommendations have been made for the government, LTTE and the international community.
Government
I. The government should do everything within its powers to protect civilians from the effects of the conflict by restricting its military attacks to international law governing internal armed conflicts.
II. The government should allow humanitarian organisations access to areas where civilians are in dire need of humanitarian assistance such as food, water, medicine and blankets.
III. It should embark on full investigation into the conflict to investigate all the human rights abuses, disappearances and killings by both LTTE and GoSL forces
IV. The government should seek for new ways of ending the conflict instead of using prohibited weapons which infringes on the rights and liberties of civilians.
LTTE
I. The LTTE should refrain from stopping and shooting civilians fleeing from their controlled zones.
II. A stop should be put on the false recruitment of civilians and the use of children as soldiers battling government forces.
III. Civilians should not be used as human shields in their fight with the GoSL forces.
IV. The LTTE should allow humanitarian workers access to their controlled zones.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Amnesty International (2009) Civilian Casualties Continue to Mount In Sri Lanka. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/civilian-casualties-continue-mount-sri-lanka-20090424 (Accessed: 27 April 2009)
Human Rights Watch (2009) War on the Displaced: Sri Lanka Army and LTTE Abuses against Civilians in Vanni. New York: HRW Publications; February 2009
International Crisis Group (2008) Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage. Brussels: Crisis Group Media. (Asia Report No 146)
Nissan, E. and Stirrat, R.L (1990) ‘The Generation of Communal Identities’, in Spencer, J. (ed.) Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict. London: Routledge, pp
PRIU (2009) Lay Down Arms, Renounce Terror – UN to LTTE. Available at: http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200904/20090423lay_down_arms_renounce_terror.htm (Accessed: 23 April 2009)
TamilNet (2009) SLA Intensifies Attacks on Safe Zone, 71 Civilians Killed, 143 Wounded. Available at: http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=28950 (Accessed: 5 April 2009)
UNHCR (2002) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/94.htm (Accessed: 20 February 2009)
UNICEF (2009) Sri Lanka: More Children Victims of the Conflict, Says UNICEF. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/media/media_48044.html (Accessed: 23 February 2009)
Van Evera, S. (1999) Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
Thursday 2 July 2009
ECOWAS in Liberia: Success or Failure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this report, the role of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) is explored in the Liberian civil war. The organization’s activities through its Military Monitoring Group ECOMOG are examined to see whether the role played by ECOWAS in bringing peace and stability to Liberia during its civil war was a success or failure. Issues considered in this report include a brief background to the civil war, formation of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), successes and problems of the group. The findings of the report is that despite the problems ECOMOG faced during its period in Liberia it managed to secure some level of peace in the first half of the conflict. The limitations or problems which it faced in terms of logistics, non-cooperation, division among member states, and human rights accusations were dealt with in one way or another to enable ECOMOG to manage and secure some level of peace and security.
INTRODUCTION
The intervention of ECOWAS in the Liberian civil war in 1990 shows the effective role regional and sub-regional organisations could in bringing peace and security in their regions without the direct involvement of the United Nations (UN). After the end of the Cold War and the successful liberation of Kuwait from the hands of Iraq, the UN sought for ways and mechanisms by which it could deal with international peace and security issues, which were on the rise due to the many regional and sub-regional conflicts. This was the mandate given to the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali by the Security Council. He came out with his ‘Agenda for Peace’, which stressed on the importance of involving regional and sub-regional organisations in maintaining peace and security in their regions (Boulden, 2003:2, 15-16; Boutros-Ghali, 1992).
As stated above, the report takes into account the involvement of ECOWAS in the maintenance of peace and security in the Liberian civil war in 1990. The role played by the organisation through its Monitoring Group – ECOMOG is evaluated along with the accusation of human rights abuse by the group and problems it faced. The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was the first peacekeeping assignment by a sub-regional organisation without the help of the UN at the initial stage to maintain peace and security (Boulden, 2003; Ero, 1995; HRW, 2003). This intervention by the ECOWAS shows how important sub-regional organisations are in the maintenance of peace and security in their region. These groups possess attributes that make them the right bodies to deal with conflicts in their regions (Boulden, 2003:2-3; Boutros-Ghali: paragraph 65, Olonisakin, 2003:111).
§ They are greatly affected by the outcomes of the conflicts and so take keen interest in finding amicable solutions. Outcomes include refugees, spread of the conflict into their regions and other cross-border activities.
§ They possess the accurate knowledge about the region which gives them the political will to intervene in comparison to international bodies.
§ They have existing personal and professional contacts to the process, which gives easy access and an ability to exert pressure that may not be available to the UN. This is true in the sense that they are based in the particular region in question with regards to the conflict and their involvement in the resolution and management process may not be seen as an intrusion by an external force by the conflicting parties. As argued by Boulden (2003:6), ‘Regional organisations are considered to be multistate geographically synchronous institutional entities that have played or are playing a role in conflict situations in Africa’.
THE BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA
The Liberian civil war has its root in the way the country was formed and ruled by the 5% Americo-Liberians between 1820 and 1980, when the first military coup by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe took place. After the oppression, maltreatment, and bad administration of the Americo-Liberians, which led to Doe’s coup, Liberians thought their new indigenous political leader was a ‘God-sent saviour’ who had come to liberate them from all their oppressions and sufferings. This was not the case as Doe turned out to bring ethnic nepotism into his administration, which led to the killings of masses of Liberians from other tribes. This became worse after rigging the 1985 elections and withstanding the coup attempt by Thomas Qwiwonkpa (Olonisakin, 2003:113-114). The Gios and Manos or the non-Khrans were his main target in the carnage that was carried out (Ero, 1995;, Adebajo, 2002:45-46; HRW, 1993; Francis et al., 2004:118).
Doe’s administration suppressed Liberians through the Armed Force of Liberia (AFL), which was known for killing many people including students, oppositions, civil servants, journalists and others. This led to the rebellion by Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), launched from Ivory Coast on 24 December 1989, which marked the genesis of the end of Doe’s administration. NPFL incursion into Liberia targeted the Krahn and Mandingo tribes who were perceived to be supporters of the Doe administration. This attack led to the creation of over 160, 000 refugees within two weeks who fled to Ivory Coast and Guinea. The situation was worsened when Doe also launched a counterinsurgency campaign, which escalated the figure to 700,000 refugees, representing one third of Liberia’s population (HRW, 1993, Olonisakin, 2003; Francis et al., 2004:121). The war reached Monrovia, the capital in the summer of 1990 and the level of mayhem and viciousness was outrageous and therefore an intervention was what was needed to bring things to normality.
As reported by HRW (1993), “In late July, five European ambassadors issued a statement warning that Liberia was sliding into "anarchy and national suicide”. Dead bodies, often mutilated, were dumped on the streets of the city or washed up on the beaches”.
THE ECOWAS INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA
The Liberian conflict came to the discussion table of ECOWAS during its 13th Head of States Summit in Banjul, Gambia on Wednesday, May 30, 1990, where it was decided that a 5 member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) be formed. The 5 member SMC was formed on Friday, July 6, 1990 in Banjul and tasked to find a peaceful settlement to the civil war and they in turn came up with the ECOMOG on Tuesday, August 7, 1990. Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were elected as its (SMC) first members (Ero, 1995; Olonisakin, 2003:114; Adebajo, 2002:51). The intervention of ECOWAS was very necessary and timely due to the situation in which the country found itself at the time:
I. The failure of America, Liberia’s godfather to intervene to save the country from collapsing, which was due to its lack of strategic interest in Africa and preoccupation with the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, all after the cold war.
II. Nationals of other ECOWAS member states especially, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were trapped in the country and needed to be rescued. This made the conflict more than an intra-conflict since it affected citizens of other ECOWAS states.
III. The death toll kept on swelling daily spreading the spilt over to neighbouring member states, which was also a threat.
IV. Destruction of the country’s economy since the economically sound counties where the country’s economic resources are found were shared among warlords who exploited them to finance their activities.
V. There was a letter from the staff at the Catholic Hospital of St. Peter’s Church and the relief organisation Medicins Sans Frontiéres (MSF) to ECOWAS to intervene militarily in early August 1990 (Ero, 1995).
VI. The activities of relief agencies were brought to a halt since they did not have access to the places where reliefs were needed due to the intensity of the war.
ECOWAS sent ECOMOG to Liberia with the mandate to separate the warring factions and to stop the bloodshed in the country in August 1990. Charles Taylor and his NPFL were a hindrance to the mandate of ECOMOG, which was to impose cease-fire, assist in the formation of an interim government and holding of elections within 12 months. This was because NPFL saw the Nigerian dominated ECOMOG as an enemy and was suspicious of the group and met them with fierce attack (HRW, 1993; Ero, 1995; Serro, 2000; Adebajo, 2002:50; Olonisakin, 2003:114-117).
Based on the reason of humanitarianism, it can be argued that the ECOWAS intervention was needed to rescue foreigners and nationals from the killings and abuses that were going on in Liberia. The situation in Liberia was very bad as both nationals and foreigners (Ghanaians, Nigerians, and Sierra Leoneans) were killed without any justifiable reason (Serro, 2000:10; HRW, 1993, Adebajo, 2002:47-49). Intervention, according to Coady (2003:275)
‘is an intentional act of one state or group of states or an international agency aimed at exercising overriding authority over what are normally the “internal” policies or practices of another state or group of states’.
Humanitarian interventions are aimed at rescuing foreign nationals and citizens from harm being meted on them by the state authorities that are responsible for their protection. The doctrine is summarised in the phrase ‘the right to intervene’, which means that a group of states has the right to undertake armed intervention anywhere in the world where massive and systematic human rights violations are taking place (Coady, 2003:275-77). This was what was exactly happening in Liberia where warring factions and government forces turned against the civilian population resulting in lots of deaths and creation of refugees. The successes and failures of ECOMOG, including accusations against the intervention in Liberia are analysed below.
SUCCESSES OF THE ECOWAS INTERVENTION
ECOWAS used two main techniques in bringing about peace and stability into Liberia: diplomatic and military techniques. The diplomatic techniques involved the signing of treaties by warring factions and government and the military intervention was the use of ECOMOG. The focal point of ECOWAS intervention in this report as started earlier is the military intervention by ECOMOG.
ECOMOG managed to bring to a halt the cruelties and abuses of human rights that were going on when it intervened in August 1990 despite the belligerent nature of the NPFL who saw the group as its enemy (Ero, 1995; Olonisakin, 2003:116; Adebajo, 2002:51-52, Serro, 2000:101, HRW, 1993; BBC, 1999). Monrovia once again became a safe haven for its settlers and people were in a way safer than they were prior to the intervention. According to a report by HRW (1993) Liberians were pleased with the ECOMOG intervention and it was hard to visit Monrovia at that time without hearing certain expressions. The appreciations and sentiments of Monrovia residents were sum up by a Liberian Medical Worker who said;
“ECOMOG was our saviour; it was our salvation. ECOMOG saved the population of Monrovia. They avoided fighting, but were pushed into a corner. We feel sorry for them; they have no cause to die here for this stupid, senseless war”.
This peaceful and stable achievement was as a result of ECOMOG’s ability to drive or curtail the incursions and crimes carried out by the NPFL, the largest faction group. The intervention brought concrete human rights improvement and minimised the ethnic-based killings and allowed the flow of humanitarian relief items. Humanitarian and Aid groups had no access into Monrovia where the peak of the conflict was and this resulted in fatalities since the civilians who needed these aids did not have them. Judging from the number of forces of the NPFL (12,500), there seemed no means that the small ECOMOG contingent of 3000 troops, which increased a month later to 6,000, could have resisted the NPFL attack on it but it was able to resist NPFL in 1990. This is something that ECOMOG achieved, which to some (Adebajo, 2002; HRW, 1993; Ero, 1995) was great.
ECOMOG was able to confine the AFL and another splinter of the NPFL, INPFL led by Prince Yeduo Johnson to their barracks, which also enabled the flow of humanitarian reliefs into Monrovia which were much needed to tackle the humanitarian problems. These two groups were the second and fourth largest factions respectively during the civil war and their activities also led to the death of many civilians. ECOMOGs ability to confine them to their barracks meant reduction in hostilities, confrontations and death, which in a way allowed international humanitarian and relief groups to come in with their humanitarian and relief assistance.
ECOMOG was able to answer its critics who accused it of being an Anglophone community by involving troops from Senegal and Mali in its peacekeeping force in Liberia. 1500 Senegalese troops arrived in Liberia in early 1992 to assist the already existing ECOMOG force to breakdown the dominance of the force by Anglophone countries. The use of Francophone capitals for peace talks and the selection of five new committee members, which included three Francophone states, also confirm this fact. This to some extent reduced the portrayal of the force as an Anglophone force and to win the confidence and support of some of the Francophone states. ECOMOG was able to attain the support of UN and OAU support militarily to bolster its international legitimacy for the intervention, which it was lacking. This was a milestone achievement as OAU (now AU) supplied troops from Tanzania and Uganda and extra-regional UN peacekeepers legitimising the actions of ECOMOG (Adebajo, 2002:51-53; Olonisakin, 2003:118-9). This in a way fastened ECOMOGs operation in Liberia since it secured the assistance of other international body to build its confidence.
Despite the logistical limitations faced by ECOMOG, which affected its operations in Liberia, it was able to subdue and drive NPFL out of the capital, Monrovia when NPFL embarked on ‘Operation Octopus’ in October 1992. This operation was aimed at exterminating the forces of ECOMOG but ECOMOG quickly switched from peacekeeping to peace enforcement which enabled them to combat NPFL (Olonisakin, 2003:116-7; Adebajo, 2002: 55; Ero, 1995, HRW, 1993). ECOMOG was able to combat NPFL through its collaboration with two of the anti-NPFL warring factions and as a result was accused of being partial. This response by ECOMOG to the ‘Operation Octopus’ enabled it to seize some strategic locations in Liberia like the ports of Greenville and Buchanan from the control of NPFL. These were some of the places where the countries natural resources like rubber, diamond, timber and others were found. NPFL and other groups exploited these resources to finance their activities; therefore the seizure of these strategic areas meant a reduction to the illicit trade carried out by the groups. Between US$300 million and US$500 million worth of gold and diamonds as well as US$53 million worth of timber were exported to European and Southeast Asian markets by these warlords (Adebajo, 2002:47-48).
ECOMOG played a significant role in the 1997 elections in Liberia which was won by Charles Taylor. The July 1997 elections can be said to be much more democratic, free and fair and an improvement over the first elections in 1985, which was rigged by Samuel Doe. ECOMOG role led to the installation of Liberia’s independent elections commission and the Supreme Court in Monrovia, which supervised the elections since the security needed by these bodies was given. ECOMOG forces were deployed to all the 1,864 polling stations at the time to ensure voters could vote in a peaceful and stable environment. This in a way reduce the fear, intimidation, harassment, fighting and eventual rigging, which characterised the 1985 elections. Their success here can be summed up in the report of the UN, which deemed the elections as “free and fair” (Adebajo, 2002:52, 64-65; HRW, 1993).
PROBLEMS, CRITICISMS AND FAILURES OF ECOWAS
ECOMOG has been criticised for many things during its intervention in Liberia. This section of the report takes into account some of the problems, criticisms and failures of ECOMOG.
ECOMOGs first major problem came as a result of the division among and impartiality of some of its members. They took sides and gave assistance to the parties involved in the civil unrest in various forms. This division greatly affected the mandate of ECOMOG since there was no cooperation and casted lots of doubt about the intentions of ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia. Ivorian president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny in his quest to revenge the death of his son-in-law and president of Liberia Benedict Tolbert and William Tolbert respectively, supported anti-Doe insurgencies especially the NPFL and even allowed them to launch their attack on Doe’s regime from Ivory Coast. Libya also played a part by giving guerrilla training to NPFL forces to revenge for Doe’s closure of the Libyan embassy in Liberia in 1981 and supporting U.S anti-Libyan policies. Nigeria who was a major contributor to ECOMOGs troop also supported Doe and AFL for personal reasons (Adebajo, 2002:48; Olonisakin, 2003:117-8; Ero, 1995; Francis et al., 2004: 120). This lack of neutrality in ECOWAS coupled with exploitation of the illegal war economy hampered ECOMOGs operation making it difficult to achieve a peace deal in its first two – three months in Liberia.
HRW (1993) accused ECOMOG of not integrating human rights protection and promotion into its activities. It argued that ECOMOG pursued peace in Liberia without a recognition of the centrality of human rights and this left the group embroiled in a conflict with few prospects for resolution. ECOMOG who was meant to protect civilians was involved in some gruesome activities; the protector of rights turned out to be violator of rights. ECOMOG forces sexually abused and harassed many Liberian women who sought refuge from them but they were meant to protect these women from such crimes. These troops were involved in massive lootings and took advantage of the situation in Liberia to amass wealth and even exported them to their home countries. Cars, gadgets and other household items were stolen and ECOMOG was corrupted to stand for ‘Every Car Or Moving Object Gone’. Troops from Nigeria were the worst culprits (Gberie, 2003:149).
ECOMOG was faced with logistical restraints. The group was ill-equipped looking at the kind of situation they were expected to deal with in Liberia. As a result of the gains that warlords had from the exploitation of Liberia’s mineral endowments they were well armed with heavy weapons and other ammunitions to overpower the strength of ECOMOG. This in part explains why ECOMOG found it difficult to fight back NPFLs ‘Operation Octopus’. To explain how poorly ECOMOG was armed to battle the situation, a reference can be made to the situation in 1995 where it had only one serviceable helicopter that was even used by its commander as his personal taxi (Gberie, 2003:149; HRW, 1993; Francis et al., 2004: 119).
ECOMOG also failed to be neutral, impartial and involved itself in undemocratic practices during the 1997 elections. ECOMOG forces greatly involved themselves in the campaigning process and campaigned for Taylor to be president since it was believed that clashes would continue should he lose the election. ECOMOG forces were seen escorting Taylor to cast his vote.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this report attention was focused on ECOWAS military intervention, success and some problems, criticisms and failure of the operation in Liberia. It shows how important sub-regional organisation can be in finding lasting solutions to conflicts in their region. It also shows how regional organisation can employ severe strategies to deal with compelling issues. Though the intervention was fraught with many problems including lack of neutrality, logistical, financial constraints and the Anglophone-Francophone rivalry, it managed to bring some level of peace to Liberia. Below are some recommendations for ECOWAS
§ The ECOMOG troops should not be dominated by one country which could always result in monopoly of power by that country. There should be equal representation from member states.
§ Human rights guarantees should be included in ECOMOG interventions
§ Much should be done to reduce the tension between the Anglophone and Francophone states especially between Nigeria and Ivory Coast.
In this report, the role of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) is explored in the Liberian civil war. The organization’s activities through its Military Monitoring Group ECOMOG are examined to see whether the role played by ECOWAS in bringing peace and stability to Liberia during its civil war was a success or failure. Issues considered in this report include a brief background to the civil war, formation of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), successes and problems of the group. The findings of the report is that despite the problems ECOMOG faced during its period in Liberia it managed to secure some level of peace in the first half of the conflict. The limitations or problems which it faced in terms of logistics, non-cooperation, division among member states, and human rights accusations were dealt with in one way or another to enable ECOMOG to manage and secure some level of peace and security.
INTRODUCTION
The intervention of ECOWAS in the Liberian civil war in 1990 shows the effective role regional and sub-regional organisations could in bringing peace and security in their regions without the direct involvement of the United Nations (UN). After the end of the Cold War and the successful liberation of Kuwait from the hands of Iraq, the UN sought for ways and mechanisms by which it could deal with international peace and security issues, which were on the rise due to the many regional and sub-regional conflicts. This was the mandate given to the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali by the Security Council. He came out with his ‘Agenda for Peace’, which stressed on the importance of involving regional and sub-regional organisations in maintaining peace and security in their regions (Boulden, 2003:2, 15-16; Boutros-Ghali, 1992).
As stated above, the report takes into account the involvement of ECOWAS in the maintenance of peace and security in the Liberian civil war in 1990. The role played by the organisation through its Monitoring Group – ECOMOG is evaluated along with the accusation of human rights abuse by the group and problems it faced. The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was the first peacekeeping assignment by a sub-regional organisation without the help of the UN at the initial stage to maintain peace and security (Boulden, 2003; Ero, 1995; HRW, 2003). This intervention by the ECOWAS shows how important sub-regional organisations are in the maintenance of peace and security in their region. These groups possess attributes that make them the right bodies to deal with conflicts in their regions (Boulden, 2003:2-3; Boutros-Ghali: paragraph 65, Olonisakin, 2003:111).
§ They are greatly affected by the outcomes of the conflicts and so take keen interest in finding amicable solutions. Outcomes include refugees, spread of the conflict into their regions and other cross-border activities.
§ They possess the accurate knowledge about the region which gives them the political will to intervene in comparison to international bodies.
§ They have existing personal and professional contacts to the process, which gives easy access and an ability to exert pressure that may not be available to the UN. This is true in the sense that they are based in the particular region in question with regards to the conflict and their involvement in the resolution and management process may not be seen as an intrusion by an external force by the conflicting parties. As argued by Boulden (2003:6), ‘Regional organisations are considered to be multistate geographically synchronous institutional entities that have played or are playing a role in conflict situations in Africa’.
THE BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA
The Liberian civil war has its root in the way the country was formed and ruled by the 5% Americo-Liberians between 1820 and 1980, when the first military coup by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe took place. After the oppression, maltreatment, and bad administration of the Americo-Liberians, which led to Doe’s coup, Liberians thought their new indigenous political leader was a ‘God-sent saviour’ who had come to liberate them from all their oppressions and sufferings. This was not the case as Doe turned out to bring ethnic nepotism into his administration, which led to the killings of masses of Liberians from other tribes. This became worse after rigging the 1985 elections and withstanding the coup attempt by Thomas Qwiwonkpa (Olonisakin, 2003:113-114). The Gios and Manos or the non-Khrans were his main target in the carnage that was carried out (Ero, 1995;, Adebajo, 2002:45-46; HRW, 1993; Francis et al., 2004:118).
Doe’s administration suppressed Liberians through the Armed Force of Liberia (AFL), which was known for killing many people including students, oppositions, civil servants, journalists and others. This led to the rebellion by Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), launched from Ivory Coast on 24 December 1989, which marked the genesis of the end of Doe’s administration. NPFL incursion into Liberia targeted the Krahn and Mandingo tribes who were perceived to be supporters of the Doe administration. This attack led to the creation of over 160, 000 refugees within two weeks who fled to Ivory Coast and Guinea. The situation was worsened when Doe also launched a counterinsurgency campaign, which escalated the figure to 700,000 refugees, representing one third of Liberia’s population (HRW, 1993, Olonisakin, 2003; Francis et al., 2004:121). The war reached Monrovia, the capital in the summer of 1990 and the level of mayhem and viciousness was outrageous and therefore an intervention was what was needed to bring things to normality.
As reported by HRW (1993), “In late July, five European ambassadors issued a statement warning that Liberia was sliding into "anarchy and national suicide”. Dead bodies, often mutilated, were dumped on the streets of the city or washed up on the beaches”.
THE ECOWAS INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA
The Liberian conflict came to the discussion table of ECOWAS during its 13th Head of States Summit in Banjul, Gambia on Wednesday, May 30, 1990, where it was decided that a 5 member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) be formed. The 5 member SMC was formed on Friday, July 6, 1990 in Banjul and tasked to find a peaceful settlement to the civil war and they in turn came up with the ECOMOG on Tuesday, August 7, 1990. Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were elected as its (SMC) first members (Ero, 1995; Olonisakin, 2003:114; Adebajo, 2002:51). The intervention of ECOWAS was very necessary and timely due to the situation in which the country found itself at the time:
I. The failure of America, Liberia’s godfather to intervene to save the country from collapsing, which was due to its lack of strategic interest in Africa and preoccupation with the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, all after the cold war.
II. Nationals of other ECOWAS member states especially, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were trapped in the country and needed to be rescued. This made the conflict more than an intra-conflict since it affected citizens of other ECOWAS states.
III. The death toll kept on swelling daily spreading the spilt over to neighbouring member states, which was also a threat.
IV. Destruction of the country’s economy since the economically sound counties where the country’s economic resources are found were shared among warlords who exploited them to finance their activities.
V. There was a letter from the staff at the Catholic Hospital of St. Peter’s Church and the relief organisation Medicins Sans Frontiéres (MSF) to ECOWAS to intervene militarily in early August 1990 (Ero, 1995).
VI. The activities of relief agencies were brought to a halt since they did not have access to the places where reliefs were needed due to the intensity of the war.
ECOWAS sent ECOMOG to Liberia with the mandate to separate the warring factions and to stop the bloodshed in the country in August 1990. Charles Taylor and his NPFL were a hindrance to the mandate of ECOMOG, which was to impose cease-fire, assist in the formation of an interim government and holding of elections within 12 months. This was because NPFL saw the Nigerian dominated ECOMOG as an enemy and was suspicious of the group and met them with fierce attack (HRW, 1993; Ero, 1995; Serro, 2000; Adebajo, 2002:50; Olonisakin, 2003:114-117).
Based on the reason of humanitarianism, it can be argued that the ECOWAS intervention was needed to rescue foreigners and nationals from the killings and abuses that were going on in Liberia. The situation in Liberia was very bad as both nationals and foreigners (Ghanaians, Nigerians, and Sierra Leoneans) were killed without any justifiable reason (Serro, 2000:10; HRW, 1993, Adebajo, 2002:47-49). Intervention, according to Coady (2003:275)
‘is an intentional act of one state or group of states or an international agency aimed at exercising overriding authority over what are normally the “internal” policies or practices of another state or group of states’.
Humanitarian interventions are aimed at rescuing foreign nationals and citizens from harm being meted on them by the state authorities that are responsible for their protection. The doctrine is summarised in the phrase ‘the right to intervene’, which means that a group of states has the right to undertake armed intervention anywhere in the world where massive and systematic human rights violations are taking place (Coady, 2003:275-77). This was what was exactly happening in Liberia where warring factions and government forces turned against the civilian population resulting in lots of deaths and creation of refugees. The successes and failures of ECOMOG, including accusations against the intervention in Liberia are analysed below.
SUCCESSES OF THE ECOWAS INTERVENTION
ECOWAS used two main techniques in bringing about peace and stability into Liberia: diplomatic and military techniques. The diplomatic techniques involved the signing of treaties by warring factions and government and the military intervention was the use of ECOMOG. The focal point of ECOWAS intervention in this report as started earlier is the military intervention by ECOMOG.
ECOMOG managed to bring to a halt the cruelties and abuses of human rights that were going on when it intervened in August 1990 despite the belligerent nature of the NPFL who saw the group as its enemy (Ero, 1995; Olonisakin, 2003:116; Adebajo, 2002:51-52, Serro, 2000:101, HRW, 1993; BBC, 1999). Monrovia once again became a safe haven for its settlers and people were in a way safer than they were prior to the intervention. According to a report by HRW (1993) Liberians were pleased with the ECOMOG intervention and it was hard to visit Monrovia at that time without hearing certain expressions. The appreciations and sentiments of Monrovia residents were sum up by a Liberian Medical Worker who said;
“ECOMOG was our saviour; it was our salvation. ECOMOG saved the population of Monrovia. They avoided fighting, but were pushed into a corner. We feel sorry for them; they have no cause to die here for this stupid, senseless war”.
This peaceful and stable achievement was as a result of ECOMOG’s ability to drive or curtail the incursions and crimes carried out by the NPFL, the largest faction group. The intervention brought concrete human rights improvement and minimised the ethnic-based killings and allowed the flow of humanitarian relief items. Humanitarian and Aid groups had no access into Monrovia where the peak of the conflict was and this resulted in fatalities since the civilians who needed these aids did not have them. Judging from the number of forces of the NPFL (12,500), there seemed no means that the small ECOMOG contingent of 3000 troops, which increased a month later to 6,000, could have resisted the NPFL attack on it but it was able to resist NPFL in 1990. This is something that ECOMOG achieved, which to some (Adebajo, 2002; HRW, 1993; Ero, 1995) was great.
ECOMOG was able to confine the AFL and another splinter of the NPFL, INPFL led by Prince Yeduo Johnson to their barracks, which also enabled the flow of humanitarian reliefs into Monrovia which were much needed to tackle the humanitarian problems. These two groups were the second and fourth largest factions respectively during the civil war and their activities also led to the death of many civilians. ECOMOGs ability to confine them to their barracks meant reduction in hostilities, confrontations and death, which in a way allowed international humanitarian and relief groups to come in with their humanitarian and relief assistance.
ECOMOG was able to answer its critics who accused it of being an Anglophone community by involving troops from Senegal and Mali in its peacekeeping force in Liberia. 1500 Senegalese troops arrived in Liberia in early 1992 to assist the already existing ECOMOG force to breakdown the dominance of the force by Anglophone countries. The use of Francophone capitals for peace talks and the selection of five new committee members, which included three Francophone states, also confirm this fact. This to some extent reduced the portrayal of the force as an Anglophone force and to win the confidence and support of some of the Francophone states. ECOMOG was able to attain the support of UN and OAU support militarily to bolster its international legitimacy for the intervention, which it was lacking. This was a milestone achievement as OAU (now AU) supplied troops from Tanzania and Uganda and extra-regional UN peacekeepers legitimising the actions of ECOMOG (Adebajo, 2002:51-53; Olonisakin, 2003:118-9). This in a way fastened ECOMOGs operation in Liberia since it secured the assistance of other international body to build its confidence.
Despite the logistical limitations faced by ECOMOG, which affected its operations in Liberia, it was able to subdue and drive NPFL out of the capital, Monrovia when NPFL embarked on ‘Operation Octopus’ in October 1992. This operation was aimed at exterminating the forces of ECOMOG but ECOMOG quickly switched from peacekeeping to peace enforcement which enabled them to combat NPFL (Olonisakin, 2003:116-7; Adebajo, 2002: 55; Ero, 1995, HRW, 1993). ECOMOG was able to combat NPFL through its collaboration with two of the anti-NPFL warring factions and as a result was accused of being partial. This response by ECOMOG to the ‘Operation Octopus’ enabled it to seize some strategic locations in Liberia like the ports of Greenville and Buchanan from the control of NPFL. These were some of the places where the countries natural resources like rubber, diamond, timber and others were found. NPFL and other groups exploited these resources to finance their activities; therefore the seizure of these strategic areas meant a reduction to the illicit trade carried out by the groups. Between US$300 million and US$500 million worth of gold and diamonds as well as US$53 million worth of timber were exported to European and Southeast Asian markets by these warlords (Adebajo, 2002:47-48).
ECOMOG played a significant role in the 1997 elections in Liberia which was won by Charles Taylor. The July 1997 elections can be said to be much more democratic, free and fair and an improvement over the first elections in 1985, which was rigged by Samuel Doe. ECOMOG role led to the installation of Liberia’s independent elections commission and the Supreme Court in Monrovia, which supervised the elections since the security needed by these bodies was given. ECOMOG forces were deployed to all the 1,864 polling stations at the time to ensure voters could vote in a peaceful and stable environment. This in a way reduce the fear, intimidation, harassment, fighting and eventual rigging, which characterised the 1985 elections. Their success here can be summed up in the report of the UN, which deemed the elections as “free and fair” (Adebajo, 2002:52, 64-65; HRW, 1993).
PROBLEMS, CRITICISMS AND FAILURES OF ECOWAS
ECOMOG has been criticised for many things during its intervention in Liberia. This section of the report takes into account some of the problems, criticisms and failures of ECOMOG.
ECOMOGs first major problem came as a result of the division among and impartiality of some of its members. They took sides and gave assistance to the parties involved in the civil unrest in various forms. This division greatly affected the mandate of ECOMOG since there was no cooperation and casted lots of doubt about the intentions of ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia. Ivorian president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny in his quest to revenge the death of his son-in-law and president of Liberia Benedict Tolbert and William Tolbert respectively, supported anti-Doe insurgencies especially the NPFL and even allowed them to launch their attack on Doe’s regime from Ivory Coast. Libya also played a part by giving guerrilla training to NPFL forces to revenge for Doe’s closure of the Libyan embassy in Liberia in 1981 and supporting U.S anti-Libyan policies. Nigeria who was a major contributor to ECOMOGs troop also supported Doe and AFL for personal reasons (Adebajo, 2002:48; Olonisakin, 2003:117-8; Ero, 1995; Francis et al., 2004: 120). This lack of neutrality in ECOWAS coupled with exploitation of the illegal war economy hampered ECOMOGs operation making it difficult to achieve a peace deal in its first two – three months in Liberia.
HRW (1993) accused ECOMOG of not integrating human rights protection and promotion into its activities. It argued that ECOMOG pursued peace in Liberia without a recognition of the centrality of human rights and this left the group embroiled in a conflict with few prospects for resolution. ECOMOG who was meant to protect civilians was involved in some gruesome activities; the protector of rights turned out to be violator of rights. ECOMOG forces sexually abused and harassed many Liberian women who sought refuge from them but they were meant to protect these women from such crimes. These troops were involved in massive lootings and took advantage of the situation in Liberia to amass wealth and even exported them to their home countries. Cars, gadgets and other household items were stolen and ECOMOG was corrupted to stand for ‘Every Car Or Moving Object Gone’. Troops from Nigeria were the worst culprits (Gberie, 2003:149).
ECOMOG was faced with logistical restraints. The group was ill-equipped looking at the kind of situation they were expected to deal with in Liberia. As a result of the gains that warlords had from the exploitation of Liberia’s mineral endowments they were well armed with heavy weapons and other ammunitions to overpower the strength of ECOMOG. This in part explains why ECOMOG found it difficult to fight back NPFLs ‘Operation Octopus’. To explain how poorly ECOMOG was armed to battle the situation, a reference can be made to the situation in 1995 where it had only one serviceable helicopter that was even used by its commander as his personal taxi (Gberie, 2003:149; HRW, 1993; Francis et al., 2004: 119).
ECOMOG also failed to be neutral, impartial and involved itself in undemocratic practices during the 1997 elections. ECOMOG forces greatly involved themselves in the campaigning process and campaigned for Taylor to be president since it was believed that clashes would continue should he lose the election. ECOMOG forces were seen escorting Taylor to cast his vote.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this report attention was focused on ECOWAS military intervention, success and some problems, criticisms and failure of the operation in Liberia. It shows how important sub-regional organisation can be in finding lasting solutions to conflicts in their region. It also shows how regional organisation can employ severe strategies to deal with compelling issues. Though the intervention was fraught with many problems including lack of neutrality, logistical, financial constraints and the Anglophone-Francophone rivalry, it managed to bring some level of peace to Liberia. Below are some recommendations for ECOWAS
§ The ECOMOG troops should not be dominated by one country which could always result in monopoly of power by that country. There should be equal representation from member states.
§ Human rights guarantees should be included in ECOMOG interventions
§ Much should be done to reduce the tension between the Anglophone and Francophone states especially between Nigeria and Ivory Coast.
The Role of International Non-Governmental Organisation in the protection of human rights during Armed Conflicts
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
Human rights and armed conflict are words that often go together, like ‘Marks & Spencer’ or ‘chicken & chips’ as armed conflicts always brings into light human rights issues. Armed conflicts result in the abuse and violation of human rights, which should be protected during conflict. The UN and other organisations have come out with rules and regulations that belligerents should adhere to but these laws are often disregarded resulting in massive human rights violations. All four treaties of the 1949 Geneva Convention and its 1977 Additional Protocols talk about the treatment and protection of non-combatants, which include; civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, members of shipwrecked and others (Okumu, 2003: 121).
Civilians, often women and children are those who mostly have their rights trampled upon and suffer enormous humiliation at the hands of combatants and as argued by Okumu (2003: 122) and Aall et al (2000:106), civilians have now become the object of attack in armed conflicts. Cases of rape and other sexual violations are common atrocities carried out by combatants as well as the involvement of children as child soldiers. Reference can be made to the 1994 Rwanda genocide, 1989/90 Liberia conflict, 1991 Sierra Leone civil war, Kosovo and Bosnia just to mention but a few where all kinds of inhumane treatments were meted on non-combatants. Governments who are supposed to protect the rights of the population under their jurisdiction at times turn to be the violators of rights; Sudan, Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
The above situation calls for the intervention by another body to take up this task or help during armed conflicts; INGOs and NGOs have taken it upon themselves to carry out such task. They have gained much credibility in the eyes of many western countries who now prefer to deal with conflicts and development especially in the third world through these organisations; they have increased much in the last 2 decades (Reimann, 2005:37; Okumu, 2003:120; Aall et al 2000:90-91; Wiseberg, 2003:347-48). This essay discusses the role of INGOs and NGOs in the protection of human rights; thus the role of human rights INGOs and NGOs in armed conflict. In answering the question the roles of these organisations have been discussed and analysed side by side with some criticisms and problems levelled against them by various scholars, governments and other entities. A conclusion is then made following the discussions.
DEFINITIONS OF INGOs AND NGOs
The UN definition of INGOs and NGOs as defined in Ahmed and Potter (2006:8) is “any international organisation which is not established by inter-governmental agreement”. This definition does not give a broader sense of what these organisations are but has been clarified by Ahmed and Potter (ibid) to exclude profit-making, violence use advocacy groups, schools or political parties. Thus nationalist and terrorist groups cannot be classified as INGOs or NGOs.
Aall et al (2000:89) give a broader definition of what INGOs and NGOs are:
“A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organisation dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society”.
NGOs to them are there to provide service to and protect sectors in the society that are underserved or seemed underserved by governments and other official institutions like the UN. Based on their activities INGOs and NGOs have being categorised into four by Aall et al (2000:94); humanitarian assistance, human rights, civil-society & democracy building and conflict resolution but some of them perform more than one of these activities. They argue that INGOs and NGOs involved in armed conflicts have the sole objective of relieving human suffering regardless of political, ethnic, religious or other affiliations. This essay is concerned with human rights INGOs and NGOs.
Human Rights INGOs and NGOs
Ahmed and Potter (2006:184 ) defines human rights NGOs as “advocacy organisations whose goals are to monitor and report human rights violations, exert pressure on governments to promote human rights, hold them accountable, and build pressure to create international machinery to end human rights violations”.
These organisations have also complemented and supplemented official development assistance and acts as watchdogs and critics.
Armed conflict as stated above results in many brutalities, abuses and violations and Aall et al (2000:105) argued, INGOs and NGOs (hereafter ‘(I)NGOs’) involved in armed conflicts have the sole objective of relieving human suffering regardless of political, ethnic, religious or other affiliation. Food, water, shelter and other basic necessities become scarce due to the chaotic environment that pertains during conflict and there are also various threats to life and human rights. Access to these things becomes very difficult but through the activities of these organisations the unreachable places become reachable as they are mostly able to meet the needs of the suffering population. Various (I)NGOs have mushroomed today and have been working earnestly at local, regional, national and international levels in the promotion of human rights during armed conflicts. The most widely known ones include; Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Oxfam and the International League for Human Rights.
ROLES OF INGOs AND NGOs IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS
Some roles of INGOs and NGOs are discussed and analysed in the below discussions. It also takes into account the criticisms and problems associated with these roles.
Fact finding or information-gathering
During armed conflict these organisations in their quest to protect human rights play fact-finding or Information-gathering, analysis and dissemination role (Wiseberg, 2003:354; Ahmed and Potter, 2000:185; Breen 2003:455). This is an important role assumed by (I)NGOs and through their operations covert activities regarding human rights in conflict are made overt. It brings to light the gruesome things meted on humanity and calls for the involvement of IGOs concerned with human rights to intervene to safeguard the situation referring to international humanitarian laws prohibiting violation of rights. Mostly these states involved in the conflict are parties to important international human rights laws and convention and as such should obey the laws concerning rights of human during these times; but it turns to be the other way round whereby these rights are violated. United Nations in their effort to investigate the allegation of human rights abuse in Eastern Zaire (D.R Congo) in the Hutu refugee camps was denied entry by President Laurent Kabila through numerous reasons in 1996. HRW (1997) detailed all the human rights violations by Kabila calling for action to be taken by UN and this gave the needed information to the UN joint mission, which was to investigate but was denied entry into Zaire. This fact-finding or information-gathering is salient since it serves as spur for discourse and this in turn offer the thrust for change at the national or international level. What seems to be secret human rights abuses in armed conflicts are now made public through this role played by these NGOs during conflict. Durham (2004:171) noticed this when he argued that states now cannot hold on to vital information on human rights during armed conflict as they did prior to the active involvement of NGOs in conflict. Also Graham Blewitt, the Deputy Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal in former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noticed the importance of this role to the prevention of human rights violation:
“NGOs, which focus on human rights, by their nature, are well equipped to assist the Tribunals in their investigation work. I say this because human rights organisations focus on the monitoring and reporting of human rights violations and seek to prevent future violations…”(Blewitt, 1996; cited in Durham, 2004:173).
Through this role they were able in 1990 to bring the attention of the international media to the breaches of International Humanitarian Laws in the Balkans especially rapes in former Yugoslavia (ibid: 172-73). In so doing the international community becomes aware of the plight of civilians and other non-combatants in the conflict and most often put pressure on the government or warring factions to respect human rights. The information from these organisations is made available through reports, magazines, newsletters and websites and they are able to get into areas where intergovernmental organisations are denied access to gain information (Schloms, 2003:40).
For humanitarian intervention to be justified in an armed conflict there should be evidence of massive human rights abuse and the intervention should be backed by proper authority – mostly UN. The information gathered by (I)NGOs on the violations of rights during conflict in a particular country could be used as evidence of massive human rights abuses, which in turn can be used as a justification for humanitarian intervention to protect human rights. Based on these information pressure can be mounted on IGOs such as the UN through lobby to warranty humanitarian intervention to prevent infringement of rights. The human rights violations and violations of the laws of war in the on-going conflict between the government forces of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been exposed through the role of NGOs like HRW and AI despite restriction on the flow of information by the government. A HRW (2009) report has detailed the various abuses and violations by both the government forces and the LTTE which include shelling of densely populated areas and use of civilians as human shield respectively. This has served as evidence, which in a way can be argued to be behind the increasing pressure on both sides to halt these violations.
Criticism of the Fact-finding and Information Mobilisation Role
Questions of neutrality and impartiality regarding the fact-finding and mobilisation of information are raised since at times information may be bias and lack facts and this may cause serious problem especially when workers for these organisations perform unprofessional work. The question here is how truthful are the facts that have been gathered by these organisations? Are they collected to just tarnish the image of belligerents or to inform the outside world about the human rights breaches in an armed conflict? Their information may be fraught with misleading facts which may not represent the actual state of things in the armed conflict with regards to human rights. Though they may have the right source for their information but as argued by Aall et al (2000:106) “they lack the sophisticated intelligence capacities of the military or of state governments.” Despite this criticism this role cannot be undermined as it has helped in protecting human right abuses.
Witnessing, Denunciation or Mobilisation of Shame
Secondly, through witnessing, denunciation or the mobilisation of shame, (I)NGOs protect human rights during armed conflicts (Wiseberg, 2003:358). This has been one major role played by (I)NGOs which is aimed at bringing shame to the perpetrators of gross human rights breaches in times of conflict. They pursue this through press releases and the mounting of press campaigns, publishing reports which are widely disseminated mostly to policy-makers. Denunciations are also carried out through films and videos, popular music or theatre and testimonies before governmental and intergovernmental bodies.
In employing these tactics, these organisations hope to amass some ends, which include shaming governments or human rights violators to halt their abuses. The infringements of rights are exposed to public glare. This action can result in the generation of international opposition, which may lead to pressure and even sanctions landed against abusing governments. This tactics was employed in June 1993 during the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna. Governmental human rights violations were uncovered and denounced by the NGO Forum through posters and pictures depicting torture scenes, faces of the disappeared and the agonies faced by people in armed conflict (ibid:359). It is not only governments who have their human rights violations exposed through this kind of role played by these organisations but also the general human rights conditions during armed conflicts are also exposed. This kind of mechanism may prompt awareness of on-going human rights situation in a conflict state and call for actions to be taken to salvage the situation. Emphasis is put on this method by (I)NGOs since government in their ‘good minds’ may not want their image to be tarnish by being labelled violators of rights and as such may act.
Belligerents engage in various means to defend themselves when their human rights issues are raised through this tactic used by (I)NGOs. They embark on offensive tactics to counter the denunciation tools used by these organisations. They do this through blatant denial of facts, classifying the organisation as subversive or terrorist group or nationalistic, hiring of high-powered public relations who give them good image (Wiseberg, 2003:358). In so doing belligerents may be able to cover up their abuses if this offensive mechanism is properly used especially when they also create government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs).
Charity and Relief
Another crucial role of (I)NGOs during armed conflict is charity and relief directed towards victims of the conflict who often are denied their rights.
Ahmed and Potter (2006:38-39) argue that most (I)NGOs like the Red Cross, Oxfam and CARE grew out of war and consider relief assistance as very detrimental in their work. The importance of this role was awarded by the giving of the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize to MSF (ibid). Internal armed conflicts lead to the creation of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) who need to be catered for in terms of shelter, food, health and other social and economic livelihoods. According to UNHRC (1999; cited in Aall et al 2000:122) report, as of 1999 approximately, 40 to 50 million people had been rendered homeless by armed conflict; out of which 20 million were refugees as a result of persecution and conflict. The remaining 20 to 30 million people were IDPs. The plights of these people are met by (I)NGOs who provide relief assistance. Relief assistance may be short term operation aimed at saving civilian lives but (I)NGOs also embark on long term operations aimed at development after conflict (ibid:123: Ahmed and Potter, 2006:185-86). Organisations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, Oxfam, ICRC and others have involved themselves in the protection of human rights through the provision of relief assistance. ICRC in February, 2009 involved itself intensively in the provision of food, water, accommodation and medical care to the victims of the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. More than 4000 sick and wounded person were evacuated to safety zones to receive care by the organisation (ICRC, 2009).
Criticism of Relief and Charity Role
Relief, charity and development assistance are important but may at times cause problems and even escalate the conflict. A case in point is the accusation levelled against (I)NGOs in the early and mid 1990s for their involvement in the escalation of the conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda (Reimann, 2005: 40: Aall et al, 2000: 107; Okumu, 2003:122-27). NGOs who provided food and other relief items to groups (civilians) affected by the conflict were accused of prolonging the conflict through their assistance. In a conflict whereby different actors are involved it becomes difficult to identify which group needs relief assistance. This is because the provision of assistance to one group may be seen as aiding that group at the expense of other victims of the conflict. Thus the relief from these organisations can land in the wrong hands.
According to Reimann (2005:40), NGOs engaged in the role of relief assistance may be seen as potential aiders of conflict through five ways; provision of resources to warring factions, freeing up internal resources for use in conflict, contributing to market distortions, legitimising of belligerents and reinforcing societal divisions and conflict. New resources are made available from the outside world and these resources may be manipulated by antagonist factions in the conflict to fuel the conflict. Belligerents get access to NGOs relief materials through stealing, making agreement with NGOs to give them access to places affected by the war (Okumu, 2003:126-27). Several NGOs that were operating in Somalia and Sudan found out that more than 80% of their food supplies had lost through theft and manipulation (Abiew, 2003:25).
PROBLEMS FACED IN ROLE PERFORMANCE
In performing their roles in armed conflict staff of these organisations faces many life threatening issues ranging from injuries, hostage, and even death. They put their lives at risk especially in states where there is no effective government or has collapsed. A consortium led by Norwegian Church Aid lost eight of its staff in southern Sudan in January 2000 (Aall et al, 2000:108). The kind of cars, gadgets, and other amenities used by these organisations may be far better than those used by the belligerents and this attracts them to attack these (I)NGOs. We should not forget that these instruments or machines used by (I)NGOs give them access to places that cannot be reached especially rough roads.
CONCLUSION
From the above discussion three important roles assumed by INGOs and NGOs have been analysed and through this discussion it may be seen that these organisations involvement in armed conflict is worthwhile and should be encouraged. Notwithstanding these phenomenal roles by these organisations which are deemed at protecting human rights during conflict, they may also be responsible for the prolongation of a conflict through their relief assistance. Care should be taken by these entities in protecting human rights during armed conflict in order not to worsen the already turbulent environment where the rights of people are being trampled upon.
Information gathered by them should be properly examined and analysed in order to come out with authentic information directed towards protection of human sufferings but not just to announce their presence to the world. In so doing the criticisms that come their way may be reduced and their fact-finding role will be trustworthy in both governmental and public arena.
Lastly (I)NGOs should have adequate security in their administration of relief assistance as thisis one of the areas where combatants take advantage and exploit to achieve their selfish
ambition of using relief materials to prolong war. As noted at times relief assistance land in the
wrong hands that use them to manipulate the conflict by starving those who need these aid.
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