ECOWAS in Liberia: Success or Failure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In this report, the role of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) is explored in the Liberian civil war. The organization’s activities through its Military Monitoring Group ECOMOG are examined to see whether the role played by ECOWAS in bringing peace and stability to Liberia during its civil war was a success or failure. Issues considered in this report include a brief background to the civil war, formation of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), successes and problems of the group. The findings of the report is that despite the problems ECOMOG faced during its period in Liberia it managed to secure some level of peace in the first half of the conflict. The limitations or problems which it faced in terms of logistics, non-cooperation, division among member states, and human rights accusations were dealt with in one way or another to enable ECOMOG to manage and secure some level of peace and security.

INTRODUCTION

The intervention of ECOWAS in the Liberian civil war in 1990 shows the effective role regional and sub-regional organisations could in bringing peace and security in their regions without the direct involvement of the United Nations (UN). After the end of the Cold War and the successful liberation of Kuwait from the hands of Iraq, the UN sought for ways and mechanisms by which it could deal with international peace and security issues, which were on the rise due to the many regional and sub-regional conflicts. This was the mandate given to the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali by the Security Council. He came out with his ‘Agenda for Peace’, which stressed on the importance of involving regional and sub-regional organisations in maintaining peace and security in their regions (Boulden, 2003:2, 15-16; Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

As stated above, the report takes into account the involvement of ECOWAS in the maintenance of peace and security in the Liberian civil war in 1990. The role played by the organisation through its Monitoring Group – ECOMOG is evaluated along with the accusation of human rights abuse by the group and problems it faced. The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was the first peacekeeping assignment by a sub-regional organisation without the help of the UN at the initial stage to maintain peace and security (Boulden, 2003; Ero, 1995; HRW, 2003). This intervention by the ECOWAS shows how important sub-regional organisations are in the maintenance of peace and security in their region. These groups possess attributes that make them the right bodies to deal with conflicts in their regions (Boulden, 2003:2-3; Boutros-Ghali: paragraph 65, Olonisakin, 2003:111).

§ They are greatly affected by the outcomes of the conflicts and so take keen interest in finding amicable solutions. Outcomes include refugees, spread of the conflict into their regions and other cross-border activities.

§ They possess the accurate knowledge about the region which gives them the political will to intervene in comparison to international bodies.

§ They have existing personal and professional contacts to the process, which gives easy access and an ability to exert pressure that may not be available to the UN. This is true in the sense that they are based in the particular region in question with regards to the conflict and their involvement in the resolution and management process may not be seen as an intrusion by an external force by the conflicting parties. As argued by Boulden (2003:6), ‘Regional organisations are considered to be multistate geographically synchronous institutional entities that have played or are playing a role in conflict situations in Africa’.

THE BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA

The Liberian civil war has its root in the way the country was formed and ruled by the 5% Americo-Liberians between 1820 and 1980, when the first military coup by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe took place. After the oppression, maltreatment, and bad administration of the Americo-Liberians, which led to Doe’s coup, Liberians thought their new indigenous political leader was a ‘God-sent saviour’ who had come to liberate them from all their oppressions and sufferings. This was not the case as Doe turned out to bring ethnic nepotism into his administration, which led to the killings of masses of Liberians from other tribes. This became worse after rigging the 1985 elections and withstanding the coup attempt by Thomas Qwiwonkpa (Olonisakin, 2003:113-114). The Gios and Manos or the non-Khrans were his main target in the carnage that was carried out (Ero, 1995;, Adebajo, 2002:45-46; HRW, 1993; Francis et al., 2004:118).

Doe’s administration suppressed Liberians through the Armed Force of Liberia (AFL), which was known for killing many people including students, oppositions, civil servants, journalists and others. This led to the rebellion by Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), launched from Ivory Coast on 24 December 1989, which marked the genesis of the end of Doe’s administration. NPFL incursion into Liberia targeted the Krahn and Mandingo tribes who were perceived to be supporters of the Doe administration. This attack led to the creation of over 160, 000 refugees within two weeks who fled to Ivory Coast and Guinea. The situation was worsened when Doe also launched a counterinsurgency campaign, which escalated the figure to 700,000 refugees, representing one third of Liberia’s population (HRW, 1993, Olonisakin, 2003; Francis et al., 2004:121). The war reached Monrovia, the capital in the summer of 1990 and the level of mayhem and viciousness was outrageous and therefore an intervention was what was needed to bring things to normality.

As reported by HRW (1993), “In late July, five European ambassadors issued a statement warning that Liberia was sliding into "anarchy and national suicide”. Dead bodies, often mutilated, were dumped on the streets of the city or washed up on the beaches”.

THE ECOWAS INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA

The Liberian conflict came to the discussion table of ECOWAS during its 13th Head of States Summit in Banjul, Gambia on Wednesday, May 30, 1990, where it was decided that a 5 member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) be formed. The 5 member SMC was formed on Friday, July 6, 1990 in Banjul and tasked to find a peaceful settlement to the civil war and they in turn came up with the ECOMOG on Tuesday, August 7, 1990. Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were elected as its (SMC) first members (Ero, 1995; Olonisakin, 2003:114; Adebajo, 2002:51). The intervention of ECOWAS was very necessary and timely due to the situation in which the country found itself at the time:

I. The failure of America, Liberia’s godfather to intervene to save the country from collapsing, which was due to its lack of strategic interest in Africa and preoccupation with the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, all after the cold war.

II. Nationals of other ECOWAS member states especially, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were trapped in the country and needed to be rescued. This made the conflict more than an intra-conflict since it affected citizens of other ECOWAS states.

III. The death toll kept on swelling daily spreading the spilt over to neighbouring member states, which was also a threat.

IV. Destruction of the country’s economy since the economically sound counties where the country’s economic resources are found were shared among warlords who exploited them to finance their activities.

V. There was a letter from the staff at the Catholic Hospital of St. Peter’s Church and the relief organisation Medicins Sans Frontiéres (MSF) to ECOWAS to intervene militarily in early August 1990 (Ero, 1995).

VI. The activities of relief agencies were brought to a halt since they did not have access to the places where reliefs were needed due to the intensity of the war.

ECOWAS sent ECOMOG to Liberia with the mandate to separate the warring factions and to stop the bloodshed in the country in August 1990. Charles Taylor and his NPFL were a hindrance to the mandate of ECOMOG, which was to impose cease-fire, assist in the formation of an interim government and holding of elections within 12 months. This was because NPFL saw the Nigerian dominated ECOMOG as an enemy and was suspicious of the group and met them with fierce attack (HRW, 1993; Ero, 1995; Serro, 2000; Adebajo, 2002:50; Olonisakin, 2003:114-117).

Based on the reason of humanitarianism, it can be argued that the ECOWAS intervention was needed to rescue foreigners and nationals from the killings and abuses that were going on in Liberia. The situation in Liberia was very bad as both nationals and foreigners (Ghanaians, Nigerians, and Sierra Leoneans) were killed without any justifiable reason (Serro, 2000:10; HRW, 1993, Adebajo, 2002:47-49). Intervention, according to Coady (2003:275)

‘is an intentional act of one state or group of states or an international agency aimed at exercising overriding authority over what are normally the “internal” policies or practices of another state or group of states’.

Humanitarian interventions are aimed at rescuing foreign nationals and citizens from harm being meted on them by the state authorities that are responsible for their protection. The doctrine is summarised in the phrase ‘the right to intervene’, which means that a group of states has the right to undertake armed intervention anywhere in the world where massive and systematic human rights violations are taking place (Coady, 2003:275-77). This was what was exactly happening in Liberia where warring factions and government forces turned against the civilian population resulting in lots of deaths and creation of refugees. The successes and failures of ECOMOG, including accusations against the intervention in Liberia are analysed below.





SUCCESSES OF THE ECOWAS INTERVENTION

ECOWAS used two main techniques in bringing about peace and stability into Liberia: diplomatic and military techniques. The diplomatic techniques involved the signing of treaties by warring factions and government and the military intervention was the use of ECOMOG. The focal point of ECOWAS intervention in this report as started earlier is the military intervention by ECOMOG.

ECOMOG managed to bring to a halt the cruelties and abuses of human rights that were going on when it intervened in August 1990 despite the belligerent nature of the NPFL who saw the group as its enemy (Ero, 1995; Olonisakin, 2003:116; Adebajo, 2002:51-52, Serro, 2000:101, HRW, 1993; BBC, 1999). Monrovia once again became a safe haven for its settlers and people were in a way safer than they were prior to the intervention. According to a report by HRW (1993) Liberians were pleased with the ECOMOG intervention and it was hard to visit Monrovia at that time without hearing certain expressions. The appreciations and sentiments of Monrovia residents were sum up by a Liberian Medical Worker who said;

“ECOMOG was our saviour; it was our salvation. ECOMOG saved the population of Monrovia. They avoided fighting, but were pushed into a corner. We feel sorry for them; they have no cause to die here for this stupid, senseless war”.

This peaceful and stable achievement was as a result of ECOMOG’s ability to drive or curtail the incursions and crimes carried out by the NPFL, the largest faction group. The intervention brought concrete human rights improvement and minimised the ethnic-based killings and allowed the flow of humanitarian relief items. Humanitarian and Aid groups had no access into Monrovia where the peak of the conflict was and this resulted in fatalities since the civilians who needed these aids did not have them. Judging from the number of forces of the NPFL (12,500), there seemed no means that the small ECOMOG contingent of 3000 troops, which increased a month later to 6,000, could have resisted the NPFL attack on it but it was able to resist NPFL in 1990. This is something that ECOMOG achieved, which to some (Adebajo, 2002; HRW, 1993; Ero, 1995) was great.

ECOMOG was able to confine the AFL and another splinter of the NPFL, INPFL led by Prince Yeduo Johnson to their barracks, which also enabled the flow of humanitarian reliefs into Monrovia which were much needed to tackle the humanitarian problems. These two groups were the second and fourth largest factions respectively during the civil war and their activities also led to the death of many civilians. ECOMOGs ability to confine them to their barracks meant reduction in hostilities, confrontations and death, which in a way allowed international humanitarian and relief groups to come in with their humanitarian and relief assistance.

ECOMOG was able to answer its critics who accused it of being an Anglophone community by involving troops from Senegal and Mali in its peacekeeping force in Liberia. 1500 Senegalese troops arrived in Liberia in early 1992 to assist the already existing ECOMOG force to breakdown the dominance of the force by Anglophone countries. The use of Francophone capitals for peace talks and the selection of five new committee members, which included three Francophone states, also confirm this fact. This to some extent reduced the portrayal of the force as an Anglophone force and to win the confidence and support of some of the Francophone states. ECOMOG was able to attain the support of UN and OAU support militarily to bolster its international legitimacy for the intervention, which it was lacking. This was a milestone achievement as OAU (now AU) supplied troops from Tanzania and Uganda and extra-regional UN peacekeepers legitimising the actions of ECOMOG (Adebajo, 2002:51-53; Olonisakin, 2003:118-9). This in a way fastened ECOMOGs operation in Liberia since it secured the assistance of other international body to build its confidence.

Despite the logistical limitations faced by ECOMOG, which affected its operations in Liberia, it was able to subdue and drive NPFL out of the capital, Monrovia when NPFL embarked on ‘Operation Octopus’ in October 1992. This operation was aimed at exterminating the forces of ECOMOG but ECOMOG quickly switched from peacekeeping to peace enforcement which enabled them to combat NPFL (Olonisakin, 2003:116-7; Adebajo, 2002: 55; Ero, 1995, HRW, 1993). ECOMOG was able to combat NPFL through its collaboration with two of the anti-NPFL warring factions and as a result was accused of being partial. This response by ECOMOG to the ‘Operation Octopus’ enabled it to seize some strategic locations in Liberia like the ports of Greenville and Buchanan from the control of NPFL. These were some of the places where the countries natural resources like rubber, diamond, timber and others were found. NPFL and other groups exploited these resources to finance their activities; therefore the seizure of these strategic areas meant a reduction to the illicit trade carried out by the groups. Between US$300 million and US$500 million worth of gold and diamonds as well as US$53 million worth of timber were exported to European and Southeast Asian markets by these warlords (Adebajo, 2002:47-48).

ECOMOG played a significant role in the 1997 elections in Liberia which was won by Charles Taylor. The July 1997 elections can be said to be much more democratic, free and fair and an improvement over the first elections in 1985, which was rigged by Samuel Doe. ECOMOG role led to the installation of Liberia’s independent elections commission and the Supreme Court in Monrovia, which supervised the elections since the security needed by these bodies was given. ECOMOG forces were deployed to all the 1,864 polling stations at the time to ensure voters could vote in a peaceful and stable environment. This in a way reduce the fear, intimidation, harassment, fighting and eventual rigging, which characterised the 1985 elections. Their success here can be summed up in the report of the UN, which deemed the elections as “free and fair” (Adebajo, 2002:52, 64-65; HRW, 1993).

PROBLEMS, CRITICISMS AND FAILURES OF ECOWAS

ECOMOG has been criticised for many things during its intervention in Liberia. This section of the report takes into account some of the problems, criticisms and failures of ECOMOG.

ECOMOGs first major problem came as a result of the division among and impartiality of some of its members. They took sides and gave assistance to the parties involved in the civil unrest in various forms. This division greatly affected the mandate of ECOMOG since there was no cooperation and casted lots of doubt about the intentions of ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia. Ivorian president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny in his quest to revenge the death of his son-in-law and president of Liberia Benedict Tolbert and William Tolbert respectively, supported anti-Doe insurgencies especially the NPFL and even allowed them to launch their attack on Doe’s regime from Ivory Coast. Libya also played a part by giving guerrilla training to NPFL forces to revenge for Doe’s closure of the Libyan embassy in Liberia in 1981 and supporting U.S anti-Libyan policies. Nigeria who was a major contributor to ECOMOGs troop also supported Doe and AFL for personal reasons (Adebajo, 2002:48; Olonisakin, 2003:117-8; Ero, 1995; Francis et al., 2004: 120). This lack of neutrality in ECOWAS coupled with exploitation of the illegal war economy hampered ECOMOGs operation making it difficult to achieve a peace deal in its first two – three months in Liberia.

HRW (1993) accused ECOMOG of not integrating human rights protection and promotion into its activities. It argued that ECOMOG pursued peace in Liberia without a recognition of the centrality of human rights and this left the group embroiled in a conflict with few prospects for resolution. ECOMOG who was meant to protect civilians was involved in some gruesome activities; the protector of rights turned out to be violator of rights. ECOMOG forces sexually abused and harassed many Liberian women who sought refuge from them but they were meant to protect these women from such crimes. These troops were involved in massive lootings and took advantage of the situation in Liberia to amass wealth and even exported them to their home countries. Cars, gadgets and other household items were stolen and ECOMOG was corrupted to stand for ‘Every Car Or Moving Object Gone’. Troops from Nigeria were the worst culprits (Gberie, 2003:149).

ECOMOG was faced with logistical restraints. The group was ill-equipped looking at the kind of situation they were expected to deal with in Liberia. As a result of the gains that warlords had from the exploitation of Liberia’s mineral endowments they were well armed with heavy weapons and other ammunitions to overpower the strength of ECOMOG. This in part explains why ECOMOG found it difficult to fight back NPFLs ‘Operation Octopus’. To explain how poorly ECOMOG was armed to battle the situation, a reference can be made to the situation in 1995 where it had only one serviceable helicopter that was even used by its commander as his personal taxi (Gberie, 2003:149; HRW, 1993; Francis et al., 2004: 119).

ECOMOG also failed to be neutral, impartial and involved itself in undemocratic practices during the 1997 elections. ECOMOG forces greatly involved themselves in the campaigning process and campaigned for Taylor to be president since it was believed that clashes would continue should he lose the election. ECOMOG forces were seen escorting Taylor to cast his vote.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this report attention was focused on ECOWAS military intervention, success and some problems, criticisms and failure of the operation in Liberia. It shows how important sub-regional organisation can be in finding lasting solutions to conflicts in their region. It also shows how regional organisation can employ severe strategies to deal with compelling issues. Though the intervention was fraught with many problems including lack of neutrality, logistical, financial constraints and the Anglophone-Francophone rivalry, it managed to bring some level of peace to Liberia. Below are some recommendations for ECOWAS

§ The ECOMOG troops should not be dominated by one country which could always result in monopoly of power by that country. There should be equal representation from member states.

§ Human rights guarantees should be included in ECOMOG interventions

§ Much should be done to reduce the tension between the Anglophone and Francophone states especially between Nigeria and Ivory Coast.

The Role of International Non-Governmental Organisation in the protection of human rights during Armed Conflicts

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

Human rights and armed conflict are words that often go together, like ‘Marks & Spencer’ or ‘chicken & chips’ as armed conflicts always brings into light human rights issues. Armed conflicts result in the abuse and violation of human rights, which should be protected during conflict. The UN and other organisations have come out with rules and regulations that belligerents should adhere to but these laws are often disregarded resulting in massive human rights violations. All four treaties of the 1949 Geneva Convention and its 1977 Additional Protocols talk about the treatment and protection of non-combatants, which include; civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, members of shipwrecked and others (Okumu, 2003: 121).

Civilians, often women and children are those who mostly have their rights trampled upon and suffer enormous humiliation at the hands of combatants and as argued by Okumu (2003: 122) and Aall et al (2000:106), civilians have now become the object of attack in armed conflicts. Cases of rape and other sexual violations are common atrocities carried out by combatants as well as the involvement of children as child soldiers. Reference can be made to the 1994 Rwanda genocide, 1989/90 Liberia conflict, 1991 Sierra Leone civil war, Kosovo and Bosnia just to mention but a few where all kinds of inhumane treatments were meted on non-combatants. Governments who are supposed to protect the rights of the population under their jurisdiction at times turn to be the violators of rights; Sudan, Iraq under Saddam Hussein.

The above situation calls for the intervention by another body to take up this task or help during armed conflicts; INGOs and NGOs have taken it upon themselves to carry out such task. They have gained much credibility in the eyes of many western countries who now prefer to deal with conflicts and development especially in the third world through these organisations; they have increased much in the last 2 decades (Reimann, 2005:37; Okumu, 2003:120; Aall et al 2000:90-91; Wiseberg, 2003:347-48). This essay discusses the role of INGOs and NGOs in the protection of human rights; thus the role of human rights INGOs and NGOs in armed conflict. In answering the question the roles of these organisations have been discussed and analysed side by side with some criticisms and problems levelled against them by various scholars, governments and other entities. A conclusion is then made following the discussions.

DEFINITIONS OF INGOs AND NGOs

The UN definition of INGOs and NGOs as defined in Ahmed and Potter (2006:8) is “any international organisation which is not established by inter-governmental agreement”. This definition does not give a broader sense of what these organisations are but has been clarified by Ahmed and Potter (ibid) to exclude profit-making, violence use advocacy groups, schools or political parties. Thus nationalist and terrorist groups cannot be classified as INGOs or NGOs.

Aall et al (2000:89) give a broader definition of what INGOs and NGOs are:

“A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organisation dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society”.

NGOs to them are there to provide service to and protect sectors in the society that are underserved or seemed underserved by governments and other official institutions like the UN. Based on their activities INGOs and NGOs have being categorised into four by Aall et al (2000:94); humanitarian assistance, human rights, civil-society & democracy building and conflict resolution but some of them perform more than one of these activities. They argue that INGOs and NGOs involved in armed conflicts have the sole objective of relieving human suffering regardless of political, ethnic, religious or other affiliations. This essay is concerned with human rights INGOs and NGOs.

Human Rights INGOs and NGOs

Ahmed and Potter (2006:184 ) defines human rights NGOs as “advocacy organisations whose goals are to monitor and report human rights violations, exert pressure on governments to promote human rights, hold them accountable, and build pressure to create international machinery to end human rights violations”.

These organisations have also complemented and supplemented official development assistance and acts as watchdogs and critics.

Armed conflict as stated above results in many brutalities, abuses and violations and Aall et al (2000:105) argued, INGOs and NGOs (hereafter ‘(I)NGOs’) involved in armed conflicts have the sole objective of relieving human suffering regardless of political, ethnic, religious or other affiliation. Food, water, shelter and other basic necessities become scarce due to the chaotic environment that pertains during conflict and there are also various threats to life and human rights. Access to these things becomes very difficult but through the activities of these organisations the unreachable places become reachable as they are mostly able to meet the needs of the suffering population. Various (I)NGOs have mushroomed today and have been working earnestly at local, regional, national and international levels in the promotion of human rights during armed conflicts. The most widely known ones include; Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Oxfam and the International League for Human Rights.

ROLES OF INGOs AND NGOs IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS

Some roles of INGOs and NGOs are discussed and analysed in the below discussions. It also takes into account the criticisms and problems associated with these roles.

Fact finding or information-gathering

During armed conflict these organisations in their quest to protect human rights play fact-finding or Information-gathering, analysis and dissemination role (Wiseberg, 2003:354; Ahmed and Potter, 2000:185; Breen 2003:455). This is an important role assumed by (I)NGOs and through their operations covert activities regarding human rights in conflict are made overt. It brings to light the gruesome things meted on humanity and calls for the involvement of IGOs concerned with human rights to intervene to safeguard the situation referring to international humanitarian laws prohibiting violation of rights. Mostly these states involved in the conflict are parties to important international human rights laws and convention and as such should obey the laws concerning rights of human during these times; but it turns to be the other way round whereby these rights are violated. United Nations in their effort to investigate the allegation of human rights abuse in Eastern Zaire (D.R Congo) in the Hutu refugee camps was denied entry by President Laurent Kabila through numerous reasons in 1996. HRW (1997) detailed all the human rights violations by Kabila calling for action to be taken by UN and this gave the needed information to the UN joint mission, which was to investigate but was denied entry into Zaire. This fact-finding or information-gathering is salient since it serves as spur for discourse and this in turn offer the thrust for change at the national or international level. What seems to be secret human rights abuses in armed conflicts are now made public through this role played by these NGOs during conflict. Durham (2004:171) noticed this when he argued that states now cannot hold on to vital information on human rights during armed conflict as they did prior to the active involvement of NGOs in conflict. Also Graham Blewitt, the Deputy Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal in former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noticed the importance of this role to the prevention of human rights violation:

“NGOs, which focus on human rights, by their nature, are well equipped to assist the Tribunals in their investigation work. I say this because human rights organisations focus on the monitoring and reporting of human rights violations and seek to prevent future violations…”(Blewitt, 1996; cited in Durham, 2004:173).

Through this role they were able in 1990 to bring the attention of the international media to the breaches of International Humanitarian Laws in the Balkans especially rapes in former Yugoslavia (ibid: 172-73). In so doing the international community becomes aware of the plight of civilians and other non-combatants in the conflict and most often put pressure on the government or warring factions to respect human rights. The information from these organisations is made available through reports, magazines, newsletters and websites and they are able to get into areas where intergovernmental organisations are denied access to gain information (Schloms, 2003:40).

For humanitarian intervention to be justified in an armed conflict there should be evidence of massive human rights abuse and the intervention should be backed by proper authority – mostly UN. The information gathered by (I)NGOs on the violations of rights during conflict in a particular country could be used as evidence of massive human rights abuses, which in turn can be used as a justification for humanitarian intervention to protect human rights. Based on these information pressure can be mounted on IGOs such as the UN through lobby to warranty humanitarian intervention to prevent infringement of rights. The human rights violations and violations of the laws of war in the on-going conflict between the government forces of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been exposed through the role of NGOs like HRW and AI despite restriction on the flow of information by the government. A HRW (2009) report has detailed the various abuses and violations by both the government forces and the LTTE which include shelling of densely populated areas and use of civilians as human shield respectively. This has served as evidence, which in a way can be argued to be behind the increasing pressure on both sides to halt these violations.

Criticism of the Fact-finding and Information Mobilisation Role

Questions of neutrality and impartiality regarding the fact-finding and mobilisation of information are raised since at times information may be bias and lack facts and this may cause serious problem especially when workers for these organisations perform unprofessional work. The question here is how truthful are the facts that have been gathered by these organisations? Are they collected to just tarnish the image of belligerents or to inform the outside world about the human rights breaches in an armed conflict? Their information may be fraught with misleading facts which may not represent the actual state of things in the armed conflict with regards to human rights. Though they may have the right source for their information but as argued by Aall et al (2000:106) “they lack the sophisticated intelligence capacities of the military or of state governments.” Despite this criticism this role cannot be undermined as it has helped in protecting human right abuses.

Witnessing, Denunciation or Mobilisation of Shame

Secondly, through witnessing, denunciation or the mobilisation of shame, (I)NGOs protect human rights during armed conflicts (Wiseberg, 2003:358). This has been one major role played by (I)NGOs which is aimed at bringing shame to the perpetrators of gross human rights breaches in times of conflict. They pursue this through press releases and the mounting of press campaigns, publishing reports which are widely disseminated mostly to policy-makers. Denunciations are also carried out through films and videos, popular music or theatre and testimonies before governmental and intergovernmental bodies.

In employing these tactics, these organisations hope to amass some ends, which include shaming governments or human rights violators to halt their abuses. The infringements of rights are exposed to public glare. This action can result in the generation of international opposition, which may lead to pressure and even sanctions landed against abusing governments. This tactics was employed in June 1993 during the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna. Governmental human rights violations were uncovered and denounced by the NGO Forum through posters and pictures depicting torture scenes, faces of the disappeared and the agonies faced by people in armed conflict (ibid:359). It is not only governments who have their human rights violations exposed through this kind of role played by these organisations but also the general human rights conditions during armed conflicts are also exposed. This kind of mechanism may prompt awareness of on-going human rights situation in a conflict state and call for actions to be taken to salvage the situation. Emphasis is put on this method by (I)NGOs since government in their ‘good minds’ may not want their image to be tarnish by being labelled violators of rights and as such may act.

Belligerents engage in various means to defend themselves when their human rights issues are raised through this tactic used by (I)NGOs. They embark on offensive tactics to counter the denunciation tools used by these organisations. They do this through blatant denial of facts, classifying the organisation as subversive or terrorist group or nationalistic, hiring of high-powered public relations who give them good image (Wiseberg, 2003:358). In so doing belligerents may be able to cover up their abuses if this offensive mechanism is properly used especially when they also create government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs).

Charity and Relief

Another crucial role of (I)NGOs during armed conflict is charity and relief directed towards victims of the conflict who often are denied their rights.

Ahmed and Potter (2006:38-39) argue that most (I)NGOs like the Red Cross, Oxfam and CARE grew out of war and consider relief assistance as very detrimental in their work. The importance of this role was awarded by the giving of the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize to MSF (ibid). Internal armed conflicts lead to the creation of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) who need to be catered for in terms of shelter, food, health and other social and economic livelihoods. According to UNHRC (1999; cited in Aall et al 2000:122) report, as of 1999 approximately, 40 to 50 million people had been rendered homeless by armed conflict; out of which 20 million were refugees as a result of persecution and conflict. The remaining 20 to 30 million people were IDPs. The plights of these people are met by (I)NGOs who provide relief assistance. Relief assistance may be short term operation aimed at saving civilian lives but (I)NGOs also embark on long term operations aimed at development after conflict (ibid:123: Ahmed and Potter, 2006:185-86). Organisations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, Oxfam, ICRC and others have involved themselves in the protection of human rights through the provision of relief assistance. ICRC in February, 2009 involved itself intensively in the provision of food, water, accommodation and medical care to the victims of the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. More than 4000 sick and wounded person were evacuated to safety zones to receive care by the organisation (ICRC, 2009).

Criticism of Relief and Charity Role

Relief, charity and development assistance are important but may at times cause problems and even escalate the conflict. A case in point is the accusation levelled against (I)NGOs in the early and mid 1990s for their involvement in the escalation of the conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda (Reimann, 2005: 40: Aall et al, 2000: 107; Okumu, 2003:122-27). NGOs who provided food and other relief items to groups (civilians) affected by the conflict were accused of prolonging the conflict through their assistance. In a conflict whereby different actors are involved it becomes difficult to identify which group needs relief assistance. This is because the provision of assistance to one group may be seen as aiding that group at the expense of other victims of the conflict. Thus the relief from these organisations can land in the wrong hands.

According to Reimann (2005:40), NGOs engaged in the role of relief assistance may be seen as potential aiders of conflict through five ways; provision of resources to warring factions, freeing up internal resources for use in conflict, contributing to market distortions, legitimising of belligerents and reinforcing societal divisions and conflict. New resources are made available from the outside world and these resources may be manipulated by antagonist factions in the conflict to fuel the conflict. Belligerents get access to NGOs relief materials through stealing, making agreement with NGOs to give them access to places affected by the war (Okumu, 2003:126-27). Several NGOs that were operating in Somalia and Sudan found out that more than 80% of their food supplies had lost through theft and manipulation (Abiew, 2003:25).

PROBLEMS FACED IN ROLE PERFORMANCE

In performing their roles in armed conflict staff of these organisations faces many life threatening issues ranging from injuries, hostage, and even death. They put their lives at risk especially in states where there is no effective government or has collapsed. A consortium led by Norwegian Church Aid lost eight of its staff in southern Sudan in January 2000 (Aall et al, 2000:108). The kind of cars, gadgets, and other amenities used by these organisations may be far better than those used by the belligerents and this attracts them to attack these (I)NGOs. We should not forget that these instruments or machines used by (I)NGOs give them access to places that cannot be reached especially rough roads.

CONCLUSION

From the above discussion three important roles assumed by INGOs and NGOs have been analysed and through this discussion it may be seen that these organisations involvement in armed conflict is worthwhile and should be encouraged. Notwithstanding these phenomenal roles by these organisations which are deemed at protecting human rights during conflict, they may also be responsible for the prolongation of a conflict through their relief assistance. Care should be taken by these entities in protecting human rights during armed conflict in order not to worsen the already turbulent environment where the rights of people are being trampled upon.

Information gathered by them should be properly examined and analysed in order to come out with authentic information directed towards protection of human sufferings but not just to announce their presence to the world. In so doing the criticisms that come their way may be reduced and their fact-finding role will be trustworthy in both governmental and public arena.

Lastly (I)NGOs should have adequate security in their administration of relief assistance as this

is one of the areas where combatants take advantage and exploit to achieve their selfish

ambition of using relief materials to prolong war. As noted at times relief assistance land in the

wrong hands that use them to manipulate the conflict by starving those who need these aid.